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CALUM ANDERSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Connecticut, perhaps as much as any other state in the nation,l 
has experienced a spectacular rise in employment-related litiga­
tion.2 This increased litigation can be explained by examining the 
confluence of two recent phenomena-one economic, one legal. 
The first phenomenon is the dramatic downturn of the Con­
necticut economy, resulting in devastating job 10sses.3 Recent cuts 
in the defense industry and corporate downsizing of the insurance 
industry have dislocated tens of thousands of skilled Connecticut 
workers.4 During 1994 alone, the Connecticut labor force lost 
* Calum Anderson is counsel with the HartfordlNew York law firm of Danaher, 
Tedford, Lagnese & Neal and is a member of the Connecticut and Massachusetts bars. 
1. Several studies chronicle the rise of employment litigation nationwide. See, 
e.g., John J. Donahue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 985 (1991) (between 1970 and 1989, 
the federal courts' employment discrimination caseload grew by 2,166% while the gen­
eral federal caseload grew by only 125% during the same time period); John Edward 
Davidson, The Temptation of Performance Appraisal Abuse in Employment Litigation, 
81 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1614-17 (1995) (referring to a recent study that "found that there 
were 20,000 wrongful discharge cases on court dockets in 1992 [whereas] before the 
1980s such cases were virtually nonexistent"). 
2. In this Article, the phrase "employment-related litigation" refers to tort and 
contract-based common-law action for wrongful termination, breach of implied con­
tract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation, and also state and federal 
statute-based actions for unlawful discrimination. 
3. Job loss is not unique to Connecticut; it appears, however, to be more preva­
lent. During 1991 and 1992, about 5.5 million workers nationwide lost jobs because of 
plant closings, relocations, or insufficient work. About half of those displaced were 
"long-tenured workers," meaning that they had worked for three years or more. "Dis­
placement rates were highest in the Northeast, particularly in New Englitnd." JENNIFER 
M. GARDENER, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKER DIS­
PLACEMENT: A DECADE OF CHANGE, DISPLACED WORKERS, 1991-92, BULLETIN 2464, 
I, 9 (1995). 
4. [d. Between 1988 and 1994, private defense-related employment fell by 30,300 
jobs, or 31.5%. LINCOLN DYER, LABOR SITUATION, CONNECTICUT LABOR DEPART· 
MENT (June 27, 1995). To make matters worse, the loss of these defense-related jobs 
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47,000 jobs, climaxing three consecutive years of job 10ss.5 Unfortu­
nately, that distressing trend appears to be continuing. In June, 
1995, there were 5,652 initial unemployment claims; an increase of 
535 claims from the previous month.6 In July, the labor force lost 
an additional 4,300 jobs.7 
The corresponding phenomenon is the recent creation of new 
statutory8 and common-law9 causes of action for alleged wrongful 
discharges and other attendant torts. With each wave of layoffs 
comes the prospect of alleged wrongful employer conduct. Not sur­
prisingly, employees are taking increasing advantage of the new 
statutory, contract, and tort-based remedies now available. Conse­
has had a significant ripple-effect on the rest of the Connecticut economy. According to 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Connecticut transportation equipment indus­
try, which is largely defense-related, has an employment multiplier of 2.5, meaning that 
each job in that industry supports another 1.5 jobs in the surrounding economy. Id. 
5. See DAVID POST, CONNECfICUT LABOR DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REVISION TO 
I;ABOR FORCE ESTIMATES, LABOR SITUATION (1995). 
6. LABOR SITUATION, CONNEcnCUT DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (August 2,1995). 
7. Andrew Julian & Dan Haar, Connecticut Shed 4,300 Jobs in Month of July, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 31, 1995 at Fl. 
8. Recent federal legislation designed to protect employees includes the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-99 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.); the Age Discrimina­
tion in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); TItle 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2oo0e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993). 
Connecticut legislation designed to protect employees from unlawful discrimina­
tion includes CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (1993) (barring discrimination in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race, color, religious creed, age, 
sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, 
mental retardation, learning disability, or physical disability); § 46a-81b (1993) (barring 
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of 
sexual orientation). 
9. Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676,513 A.2d 66 (1986) (the Con­
necticut Supreme Court first recognized that an employer may be liable to a current or 
former employee for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the employer should 
have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress that 
might result in illness or bodily harm); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 254-55, 510 A.2d 
1337, 1343 (1986) (the Connecticut Supreme Court first recognized that an employer 
may be liable to a current or former employee for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress for acts occurring during the course of employment or in connection with a 
discharge); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 569, 479 A.2d 781, 787 
(1984) (the Connecticut Supreme Court first recognized, in every employment contract, 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 
Inc., 179 Conn. 471,475,427 A.2d 385, 386-87 (1980) (the Connecticut Supreme Court 
first recognized a common-law cause of action in tort for discharge of an at-will em­
ployee "if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismis­
sal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public 
policy"). 
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quently, what started out as a cottage industry in the 1980s has now 
become a major area of Connecticut litigation practice. 
Faced with this dramatic increase in employment-related 
claims and the potential liabilities they represent,lO employers are 
looking to their liability insurers for defense and indemnity. In re­
sponse, insurers have asserted that general liability policies were 
never intended to cover employment-related claims and have raised 
numerous arguments to justify denial of coverage. Until very re­
cently these coverage defenses were not tested in the courts, and 
even now the resolution of many is uncertain, particularly in 
Connecticut. 
This Article analyzes the duties and responsibilities of a gen­
eral liability insurer under Connecticut law when one of its policy­
holders presents an employment-related coverage claim. Those 
duties and responsibilities are determined by a close reading of the 
underlying complaint to glean whether any of the claims asserted 
could possibly be covered by the policy. In that regard, the insurer 
must have significant familiarity with each common-law and statu­
tory cause of action asserted in order to determine whether the 
claim is covered by the Insuring Agreement and if so, whether an 
exclusion is applicable. Therefore, Part I of this Article briefly de­
scribes the elements of the various common-law and statutory 
causes of action available to Connecticut employees for employ­
ment-related claims. Part II outlines Connecticut law governing the 
insurer's duty to defend, including the consequences of wrongfully 
refusing to defend. Part III identifies the coverage issues presented 
by each of the causes of action and attempts to determine how Con­
necticut courts might resolve those issues. Part IV concludes that 
. Connecticut case law is largely silent with respect to most of the 
coverage issues presented and that the insurers and policy holders 
must postulate their respective rights and obligations based on gen­
eral Connecticut insurance law principles and case law from other 
jurisdictions. 
I. EMPLOYMENT-ToRT CAUSES OF ACTION IN CONNECTICUT 
In order for an insurer to determine its coverage obligations, it 
10. "In 1991, the National Conference of Unifonn State Law found that in Cali­
fornia, 70% of plaintiffs won wrongful discharge cases going to a jury trial, receiving 
average awards of $300,000 to $500,000. The commissioners also found that awards of 
over $1,000,000 were common throughout the country, and that the average cost of 
defending a wrongful discharge lawsuit was $80,000." Davidson, supra note 1, at 1615­
16. 
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must have a full understanding of each cause of action presented 
for coverage. That understanding must be derived from a careful 
reading of the underlying complaint and knowledge of the substan­
tive, statutory, contract, and tort-based causes of action alleged. 
The determination of coverage obligations is particularly challeng­
ing in a rapidly changing area of the law such as employment, 
where the substantive law is relatively new and still developing. 
The remaining section of Part I outlines the elements of the 
various causes of actionll available to employees under Connecticut 
and federal law. These elements constitute the predicate for insur­
ance coverage analysis. 
A. Discharge 
1. Wrongful Discharge of At-Will Employees 
Until very recently, a Connecticut employer was free to termi­
nate the employment of an at-will employee for any reason or for 
no reason at all.12 In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,B the 
Connecticut Supreme Court created a narrow exception to this rule 
by recognizing a common-law cause of action in tort "if the former 
employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, 
a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important viola­
tion of public policy."14 The court went on to conclude that "[t]he 
issue then becomes the familiar common-law problem of deciding 
where and how to draw the line between claims that genuinely in­
volve the mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordi­
nary disputes between employee and employer that are not."lS In 
deciding the issue within the context of a particular case, the Con­
11. Each theory of liability merits a full-length article to explore the intricacies of 
the developing case law. This Article provides an overview of the elements of each 
cause of action, especially those elements that impact insurance coverage. 
12. Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 736-37, 188 A.2d 316, 317 (1955). "In the 
absence of a consideration in addition to the rendering of services incident to the em­
ployment, an agreement for a permanent employment is no more than an indefinite 
general hiring, terminable at the will of either party without incurring liability to the 
other." Id. at 736, 188 A.2d at 317. Furthermore, the court stated that "the mere giving 
up of a job by one who decides to accept a contract for alleged life employment is but 
an incident necessary on his part to place himself in a position to accept and perform 
the contract; it is not consideration for a life employment." Id. at 737, 188 A.2d at 317. 
See also Sommers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426, 428 
(1959); Carter v. Bartek, 142 Conn. 448, 450, 114 A.2d 923, 924 (1955); Boucher v. 
Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622,627, 178 A. 655, 657 (1935). 
13. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). 
14. Id. at 475, 427 A.2d at 386-87. 
15. Id. at 477, 427 A.2d at 387. 
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necticut Supreme Court advised "that courts should not lightly in­
tervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment 
unwarranted litigation."16 The court stated that state statutes may 
evidence a public policy consideration sufficient to support a 
wrongful discharge claim.17 On the facts of the Sheets case, the 
court held that where an employee alleged that he had been dis­
charged in retaliation for his efforts to compel his employer's com­
pliance with the state Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, he had stated 
a valid cause of action.18 
Since Sheets, courts construing Connecticut law have held that 
termination of an at will employee does not violate public policy in 
cases where: (1) the employer had failed to thoroughly investigate 
charges of misappropriation of funds by an employee before firing 
him;19 (2) the employer required accurate reporting of competitor 
pricing practices (no allegation of antitrust violations) and the em­
ployee was terminated in an abusive manner;20 and (3) the dis­
charge would have "the effect" of undermining the public policy of 
promoting energy conservation.21 Connecticut courts have held 
that termination of an at-will employee did violate public policy in 
cases where: (1) the employer fired the employee in retaliation for 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389 ("We need not decide whether violation of a state 
statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a challenged discharge violates 
public policy. Certainly when there is a relevant state statute we should not ignore the 
statement of public policy that it represents."). 
18. Id. 
19. Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513 A.2d 66, 68 (1986): 
This public policy exception to the employment at will rule carved out in 
Sheets attempts to balance the competing interests of employer and employee. 
Under the exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving 
that his dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy. The employer 
is allowed, in ordinary circumstances, to make personnel decisions without 
fear of incurring civil liability. Employee job security, however, is protected 
against employer actions that contravene public policy. 
Id. 
20. Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 464, 528 A.2d 1137, 1139 
(1987). 
21. Battista v. United Il1uminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 497, 523 A.2d 1356, 
1362 (Borden, J.), cert. denied, 204 Conn. 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987): 
We also note that the public policy exception to the general rule of the em­
ployment at will doctrine is narrowly constructed to serve a limited purpose 
.... The language in Magnan and Morris suggests that for a discharge to be 
actionable, there must be more than an incidental effect on public policy. The 
defendant's reason for discharging the plaintiff must contravene public policy. 
Id. at 496-97, 523 A.2d at 1362-63 (emphasis added). 
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emptying a movie theater at the request of police officers;22 and (2) 
the employer fired the employee to avoid paying him a bonus and 
vested benefits.23 
2. Breach of Implied Contract 
Numerous Connecticut cases hold that an employee may prove 
that the parties had an implied agreement that the plaintiff's em­
ployment could not be terminated except for cause or following ap­
propriate disciplinary procedures.24 In analyzing such claims, the 
courts start with the premise that "all employer-employee relation­
ships not governed by express contracts involve some type of im­
plied 'contract' of employment."25 Typically, an implied contract of 
employment does not limit the terminability of an employee's em­
ployment, but merely includes terms specifying wages, working 
hours, job responsibilities, and the like. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, 
contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are 
terminable at will."26 In order to overcome the presumption that, 
unless otherwise agreed, employment contracts are terminable "at 
will," the employee must prove by a fair preponderance of the evi­
dence that "[the employer had] agreed, either by words or action or 
conduct, to undertake any form of actual contract commitment" 
that employment not be terminated without just cause.27 Thus, the 
finder of fact must weigh all the facts and circumstances that give 
rise to the formation of the employment contract in order to decide 
whether an implied intention existed that the at-will presumption 
22. Girgenti v. Cali-Con, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 130, 138, 544 A.2d 655, 659 (1988) 
("[I]t is the public policy of this state to protect the safety of the public at moving 
picture theaters."). 
23. Cook v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 246, 248, 488 A.2d 
1295,1296 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-71c(b) and 31­
71e (1993) "represent a public policy against the withholding of wages by employers"). 
24. See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceutical, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 
662 A.2d 89 (1995); Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 544 A.2d 170 (1988); 
D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 520 
A.2d 217 (1987); Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 180 Conn. 91,429 A.2d 808 (1980); 
Brighenti v. New Britain Shirt Corp., 167 Conn. 403, 356 A.2d 181 (1974); Barry v. Posi­
Seal Int'!, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1, 647 A.2d 1031 (1994); Kirchner v. Bicron Electronics 
Co., No. CV 95 0067312, 1995 WL 276085 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 3, 1995). 
25. Torosyan, 234 Conn. at 13, 662 A.2d at 96. '''There cannot be any serious 
dispute that there is a bargain of some kind; otherwise the employee would not be 
working.'" Id. (quoting 1 H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACfICE 
§ 4.32, at 326 (3d ed. 1982». 
26. D'U/isse-Cupo, 202 Conn. at 211 n.1, 520 A.2d at 220 n.1. 
27. Id. at 212 n.2, 520 A.2d at 220 n.2; Therrien, 180 Conn. at 94-95, 429 A.2d at 
809-10. 
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would not govem.28 
In order to overcome the at-will presumption, employees offer 
evidence of representations made to them during pre-employment 
interviews29 or those contained in personnel manuals30 that were 
accepted by the employee.31 The fact finder must then decide 
whether the employer's statements were mere expressions of expec­
28. Coelho, 208 Conn. at 113,544 A.2d at 174 ("Absent ... definitive contract 
language, the determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their contrac­
tual commitments is a question of the intention of the parties and an inference of 
fact."); Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prod., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 274-75, 439 A.2d 314, 
319 (1981); Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241,256, 129 A.2d 606, 615 ("This process of 
inference is peculiarly a jury function, the raison d'etre of the jury system."), appeal 
dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957). 
29. See, e.g., Coelho, 208 Conn. at 110,544 A.2d at 179. ("If you come to work 
with us, you'll never have to worry. Grow with us into the future. As long as you do 
your job, you'll ... have a good future with us."). See also Barry v. Posi-Seal Int'!, Inc., 
36 Conn. App. 1,4,647 A.2d 1031, 1034 (1994) ("[I]f you do your job, you do your 
work, you're going to have a job here. If we can make this place run and minimize the 
money loss-I mean, you do your job, you're going to have a job here."). 
30. Whether the language of the employment manual creates a contractual obli­
gation is sometimes a question of law for the court. Owens v. American Nat'l Red 
Cross, 673 F. Supp. 1156, 1165 (D. Conn. 1987). ' 
[T]he existence of a personnel manual claimed to create a contractual relation­
ship does not automatically create a question of fact which precludes summary 
judgment. In this case the threshold question is whether, interpreting all infer­
ences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the manuals created [by the 
defendant] could be found to give rise to an enforceable contract. On a mo­
tion for summary judgment, this is a question of law for the court. 
Id. 
In most situations, however, interpretation becomes a question of fact for the jury 
to decide. D'Ulisse-Cupo,202 Conn. at 214 n.3, 520 A.2d at 221 n.3. It is a question of 
fact for the jury whether statements made in a policy manual constitute a binding em­
ployment contract which modifies an otherwise at-will employment relationship. Barry, 
36 Conn. App. at 7, 647 A.2d at 1035 (citing Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 202 
Conn. 190, 199, 520 A.2d 208, 213-14 (1987). 
31. Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceutical, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 662 
A.2d 89 (1995): 
Pursuant to the legal principles governing such contracts, in order to find that 
an implied contract of employment incorporates specific representations orally 
made by the employer or contained in provisions in an employee manual, the 
trier of fact is required to find the following subordinate facts. Initially, the 
trier of fact is required to find that the employer's oral representations or issu­
ance of a handbook to the employee was an "offer" - i.e., that it was a prom­
ise to the employee that, if the employee worked for the company, his or her 
employment would thereafter be governed by those oral or written state­
ments, or both. If the oral representations and/or the handbook constitute an 
"offer," the trier of fact then is required to find that the employee accepted 
that offer. Subsequent oral representations or the issuance of subsequent 
handbooks must be evaluated by the same criteria. To be incorporated into 
the implied contract of employment, any such representation or handbook 
must constitute an offer to modify the pre-existing terms of employment by 
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tations about the future and not manifestations of a present inten­
tion to create contractual obligations.32 
3. 	 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
In Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is implied in every employment contract.33 That covenant, 
however, is limited to an implied agreement not to discharge an 
employee based on an improper motive "derive[d] from some im­
portant violation of public policy,"34 identical to the standard III 
substituting a new implied contract for the old. Furthermore, the proposed 
modifications, like the original offers, must be accepted. 
Id. at 13-14,662 A.2d at 96-97 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 & 
iIlus. 8 (1981); 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 279 (1981); 1 E. FARNS· 
WORTII, CONTRACTS § 3.24, at 290 (1990». 
32. Employers who do not intend to create an implied contract by use of em­
ployee manuals can do so by careful draftsmanship or by means of an express dis­
claimer. "By eschewing language that could reasonably be construed as a basis for a 
contractual promise or by including appropriate disclaimers of the intention to contract, 
employers can protect themselves against employee contracting claims based on state­
ments made in personnel manuals." Finley, 202 Conn. at 199 n.5, 520 A.2d at 214 n.5. 
In determining whether particular language of a manual is sufficient to create an 
effective disclaimer, courts coQ.sider such characteristics as the specificity of the dis­
claimer language relied upon by the employee, its location in the handbook, and the 
size of the print. See, e.g., Elliff v. St. Vincent's Medical Ctr., No. CV91 28 92 82 S, 1993 
WL 526587 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1993). For cases in which summary judgment has 
been granted to employers on implied contract counts based on disclaimers in em­
ployee manuals, see McClean v. Derby Say. Bank, No. CV92 02 86 60 S, 1993 WL 
225291 (Conn. Super Ct. June 3, 1993); Dellipoali v. DHL Airways, Inc., No. CV92 
0121574, 1993 WL 182647 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 26, 1993), Markgraf v. Hospital Eq­
uity Investors, Inc., No. 30 85 01, 1993 WL 53604 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 1993) 
(handbook introduction stating "the contents of the handbook are presented as a mat­
ter of information only and are not meant to be a contract" held to be sufficient dis­
claimer). For cases in which summary judgment has been denied, see Wasilewski v. 
Warner Lambert Co., No. CV93 04 44 45, 1995 WL 373928 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 
1995); Dicker v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., No. 65434 S, 1994 WL 112241 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1994) (purported disclaimer language untitled and in fine print was 
insufficient). 
33. Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558,571-72,479 A.2d 781, 788-89 
(1984) ("The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been applied by [sic] 
Court in a variety of contractual relationships, including leases."); see also Central New 
Haven Dev. Corp. v. La Crepe, Inc., 177 Conn. 212, 413 A.2d 840 (1979) (good faith 
and fair dealing applied to insurance contracts); Hoyt v. Factory Mut. Liberty Ins. Co., 
120 Conn. 156, 159, 179 A. 842, 843 (1935); Bartlett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 
155, 167 A. 180, 183 (1933). The implied covenant is "a rule of construction designed to 
fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties as they presumably in­
tended." Magnan, 193 Conn. at 567, 479 A.2d at 786. 
34. Magnan, 193 Conn. at 572, 479 A.2d at 786 (quoting Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted 
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,475,427 A.2d 385, 387 (1980». 
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wrongful discharge cases. The court specifically rejected the em­
ployee's contention that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing requires that discharge be "for cause" or that it otherwise 
intrude on the at-will employment doctrine. 
While we see no reason to exempt employment contracts from 
the implication of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
contractual relationship, we do not believe that this principle 
should be applied to transform a contract of employment termi­
nable at the will of either party into one terminable only at the 
will of the employee or for just cause. We have previously ac­
knowledged "that courts should not lightly intervene to impair 
the exercise of management discretion or to foment unwarranted 
litigation. " 
. . . To hold otherwise would render the court a bargaining 
agent for every employee not protected by statute or collective 
bargaining agreement, including employees whom Congress has 
specifically excluded from the protection of the National Labor 
Relations Act, such as those in management positions. The com­
plexity of the multifarious employment relationships militates 
against the establishment of the good cause standard for dis­
charge to govern all at-will employment relationships.35 
However, in cases involving the breach of an express contract 
or breach of an implied contract, the employee may prove a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing even in the 
absence of a violation of public pOlicy.36 
B. Attendant Torts 
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In Petyan v. Ellis,37 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
an employer may be liable to a current or former employee for in­
tentional infliction of emotional distress for acts occurring during 
the course of the employment or in connection with the discharge. 
In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ... 
[the intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements 
must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor in­
tended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should 
35. Id. at 568-69, 571, 479 A.2d at 786-87, 789 (citations omitted). 
36. Wasilewski, 1995 WL 373928; Paris v. Northeast Sav., F.A., No. CV 
910398144, 1994 WL 248061 (Conn. Super. a. June 1, 1994). 
37. 200 Conn. 243,510 A.2d 1337 (1986). 
208 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:199 
have known that the emotional distress was a likely result of his 
conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) 
that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's dis­
tress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff 
was severe.38 
Conduct is "extreme and outrageous" when it exceeds "all bounds 
usually tolerated by decent society."39 
Many of the reported cases involving the tort of intentional in­
fliction of emotional distress concern whether, as a matter of law, 
the employer's conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
make out a prima facie case.40 Connecticut courts have frequently 
held that the employer's conduct had reached the threshold of out­
rageousness, thus making it an issue for the trier of fact.41 In other 
38. Id. at 253, 510 A.2d at 1342 (citing, 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 
(1965); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145-46,355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976); 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54 
(5th ed. 1984». 
39. Id. at 254 n.5, 510 A.2d at 1342 n.5 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, 
§ 12 at 60). See also Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn. Supp. 17,20,597 A.2d 
846, 847-48 (1991). 
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to 
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the 
actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" 
Id. at 20, 597 A.2d at 847-48 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46, cmt. d 
(1965». 
40. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965). 
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or 
whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject 
to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has 
been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. 
Id. 
41. Vorvis v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 821 F. Supp. 851, 855 (D. Conn 
1993) (employee alleged that supervisor chastised, criticized, humiliated employee in 
front of co-workers, threatened to fire, expressed vulgar remarks); Mellaly, 42 Conn. 
Supp. at 21, 597 A.2d at 848 (employee alleged that the supervisor taunted and harassed 
the employee about his alcoholism and recovery); Brown v. Ellis, 40 Conn. SUpp. 165, 
167, 484 A.2d 944, 946 (1984) (employee alleged that supervisor, knowing of em­
ployee's fear of heights, assigned the employee to work on heights). 
Employers have cause for concern when a claim for intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress survives a dispositive motion. Damages for emotional distress, given ap­
propriate circumstances, can exceed lost wages. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 
939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding award of $156,000 in lost wages and over 
$3,000,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rulon-Miller v. International 
Business Mach. Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding award of 
$100,000 for compensatory harm and $200,000 for emotional distress). 
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cases Connecticut courts have also held that, as a matter of law, 
conduct did not reach the extreme and outrageous threshold that 
results in dismissa1.42 
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case 
for "unintentionally-caused emotional distress" by proving that 
"the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if 
it was caused, might result in illness or bodily harm."43 Recovery 
for unintentionally-caused emotional distress is not dependent 
upon proof of an ensuing bodily injury. Emotional distress that 
might result in illness or injury is sufficient.44 
Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress almost al­
ways attend causes of action for wrongful termination. Indeed, 
more than one court has observed that emotional distress is a natu­
ral consequence of a wrongful discharge.45 Furthermore, an em­
ployer may be liable to an at-will employee for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress based on unreasonable conduct during an 
42. Ziobro v. Connecticut Inst. for the Blind, 818 F. Supp. 497, 502 (D. Conn. 
1993) (employee alleged that employer failed to conduct an adequate investigation 
before dismissing her and that employer knew or should have known that the dismissal 
was unjustified); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337, 1338 (1986) (em­
ployee alleged that employer intentionally misrepresented employee's performance on 
unemployment compensation commission fact-finding forms). 
43. Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337,345,398 A.2d 
1180, 1184 (1978); see also Ziobro, 818 F. Supp. at 502-03; Morris v. Hartford Courant 
Co., 200 Conn. 676, 683, 513 A.2d 66, 70 (1986). 
44. Montinieri, 175 Conn. at 344, 398 A.2d at 1180 ("[T)here is no logical reason 
for making a distinction for purposes of determining liability, between those cases 
where emotional distress results in bodily injury and those cases where there is emo­
tional distress only."). See also Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance 
in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1059 (1936). 
Other jurisdictions require actual physical harm. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 
386 Mass. 540,555-56,437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982): 
We conclude that when recovery is sought for negligent, rather· than inten­
tional or reckless, infliction of emotional distress, evidence must be introduced 
that the plaintiff has suffered physical harm. This requirement, ... will serve 
to limit frivolous suits and those in which only bad manners or mere hurt feel­
ings are involved, and will provide a reasonable safeguard against false claims. 
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436 A, Negligence Resulting in 
Emotional Distress Alone (1965) .. 
45. Brooklyn Law School v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 849 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 
1988); Providence Washington Ins. Group v. Alborello, 784 F. Supp. 950, 954 (D. Conn. 
1992); Jespersen v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 131 N.H. 257,261,551 A.2d 
530, 532-33 (1988) (wrongful discharge is "inherently injurious"). 
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otherwise lawful termination.46 
3. Defamation 
An employer may defame an employee by making an "un­
privileged publication of a false and defamatory statement"47 con­
cerning the employee or the employee's work. Defamatory 
publications may occur in connection with unfavorable references 
to prospective employers, or communications to others outside the 
company that would tend to disparage the employee's work. 
Employers can also be liable for the publication of defamatory 
statements made within the company.48 While "communications 
between managers regarding the review of an employee's job per­
formance and the preparation of documents regarding an em­
ployee's termination are protected by a qualified privilege,"49 that 
qualified privilege can be overcome if the statement was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth of the 
matter asserted.50 Connecticut courts define defamation as "a false 
and malicious publication of a person which exposes him to public 
ridicule, hatred or contempt, or hinders virtuous men from associat­
ing with him."51 Like most jurisdictions, Connecticut is solicitous of 
persons' business reputations. Therefore, "[l]ibel is actionable per 
se if it charges 'improper conduct or lack of skill or integrity in 
one's profession or business and is of such a nature that it is calcu­
lated to cause injury to one in his profession or business. "'52 
In order to recover general damages for libel, the plaintiff must 
prove that the employer made publication with "malice in fact."53 
46. Morris, 200 Conn. at 681-82, 513 A.2d at 89. 
47. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 316, 477 A.2d 1005, 
1007 (1984). 
48. "Although intracorporate communications once were considered by many 
courts not to constitute 'publication' of a defamatory statement, that view has been 
almost entirely abandoned, and we reject it here." Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 234 Conn. 1,27-28,662 A.2d 89, 103 (1995). See also RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) & cmt. (i) (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, 
§ 113, at 798 (5th ed. 1984). 
49. Torosyan, 234 Conn. at 29, 662 A.2d at 103. 
50. Id. See also 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977). 
51. Donaghue v. Gaffy, 54 Conn. 257, 268, 7 A. 552, 558 (1886). 
52. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 612, 116 A.2d 
440,444 (1955) (quoting Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 566, 72 A.2d 
820, 826 (1950» (libel per se is actionable without proof of special damage). 
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-237 (1995) states: 
In any action for a libel the defendant may give proof of intention; and unless 
the plaintiff proves either malice in fact or that the defendant, after having 
been requested by him in writing to retract the libelous charge, in as public a 
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The phrase "malice in fact" means "any improper or unjustifiable 
motive"54 and does not necessarily connote "ill will or an intent or 
desire to injure."55 Malice can be proved by a showing that the 
publication was "made without authority, or such authority as 
would be regarded as entitled to credence among upright and care­
ful men, or manifesting an entire indifference to the truth."56 Simi­
larly, should the employee be a "public figure," the alleged 
defamation must have been made with "actual malice, that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not."57 
C. Wrongful Discrimination In Employment 
1. Race, Color, Religion, Sex and National Origin58 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ­
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employ­
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would de­
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em­
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.59 
The purpose of Title VII is "to assure equality of employment 
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices."6o 
"Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is 
manner as that in which it was made, failed to do so within a reasonable time, 
he shall recover nothing but such actual damages as he may have specially 
alleged and proved. 
[d. 
54. Haxhi v. Moss, 25 Conn. App. 16, 19, 591 A.2d 1275, 1277 (1991); Bleich v. 
Ortiz, 196 Conn. 498, 504, 493 A.2d 236, 240 (1985). 
55. Haxhi, 25 Conn. App. at 20, 591 A.2d at 1277. 
56. [d. at 19-20,591 A.2d at 1277 (quoting Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14,28­
29 (1858». 
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Woodstock v. 
Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525,527,644 A.2d 92, 93 (1994). 
58. Because classifications based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin 
are all governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and are the subject of very 
similar liability theories, it is convenient to discuss them together. 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1988). 
60. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
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precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required 
by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica­
tion."61 A secondary purpose is to "mak[e] [persons] whole for in­
juries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
dis crimina tion. "62 
Title VII does not preempt state employment discrimination 
laws unless such state laws are in conflict with the federal law.63 
Connecticut law does not conflict with Title VII. In fact, Connecti­
cut courts look to federal employment discrimination law for gui­
dance in enforcing Connecticut's antidiscrimination legislation.64 
a. 	 Disparate treatment as a theory for wrongful discrimination 
claims 
The disparate treatment theory is applicable where there is no 
direct evidence65 of discrimination, but the employer's actions give 
rise to an inference of discrimination. To establish a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination under the disparate treatment 
theory, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
61. 	 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971). 
62. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,419 (1975). 
Title VII may also serve to achieve a more efficient market through the elimination of 
the "transaction costs" involved in the commission of intentional discriminatory em­
ployment practices. For a discussion as to the possible market efficiencies of Title VII, 
see John J. Donahue, III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986); Rich­
ard A. Posner; The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 
(1987); John J. Donahue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legisla
tion, A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987). 
63. Tho separate sections of the act provide that state laws will be preempted 
only if they actually conflict with federal law. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-7, 2000h-4 (1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has described Title VII as "a floor beneath 
which [federal protection] may not drop rather than a ceiling above which it may not 
rise." California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) {citing 
California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985». 
64. Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 35 Conn. App. 474, 
480, 646 A.2d 893,896, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 931, 649 A.2d 253 (1994). 
65. "Direct evidence has been held to include discriminatory statements by deci­
sion makers related to the decision making process." Miko v. Commission on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192,206 n.13, 596 A.2d 396, 404 n.13 (1991). See 
also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255-58 (1989); EEOC v. Alton Packag­
ing Corp., 901 F.2d 920,924 (11th Cir. 1990). Further, "[d]irect evidence has also been 
held to include a policy discriminatory on its face." Miko, 220 Conn. at 206 n.13, 596 
A.2d at 404 n.13. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 112-22 
(1985). 
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(1) he is a member of a protected class under the statute; (2) he 
applied for and was qualified for a position for which the em­
ployer was seeking applicants; (3) he was denied the position de­
spite being qualified; and (4) the employer continued to seek 
applicants for the position after denying the plaintiff's 
application.66 
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, he "in 
effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discrimi­
nated against [him]."67 The burden then shifts to the employer to 
"produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else 
was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."68 The 
employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually moti­
vated by the proffered reasons. "69 Should the employer carry its 
burden of production, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered 
by the employer were a pretext for discrimination.7° 
b. Harassment as a theory for wrongful discrimination claims 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the form of 
disparate treatment described as "harassment."71 The most preva­
lent type, sexual harassment, can take two different forms: quid pro 
quo or hostile environment. 
An allegation of quid pro quo harassment asserts that an em­
ployee uses supervisory72 power to induce a subordinate employee 
to grant sexual favors in return for employment benefits or oppor­
66. Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 307, 
321 n.14, 596 A.2d 426, 436 n.14 (1991), affd., 228 Conn. 545, 636 A.2d 1360 (1994), 
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973»; Texas Dept. of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981). 
67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
68. Id. 
69. Id.; Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 188 Conn. 44, 61, 448 A.2d 801, 
809 (1982). 
70. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. 
71. It is also unlawful, under Title VII to harass employees on the basis of race. 
See Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981); Firefighters Inst. for Racial 
Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977), cen. denied sub nom., Banta 
v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Likewise, it is unlawful to harass employees on the basis of religion 
and national origin. See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (religion); 
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religion); see, e.g., 
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (na­
tional origin). 
72. Only supervisors, not co-workers, are deemed capable of committing quid pro 
quo sexual harassment. 
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tunities or employment itself.73 In order to establish quid pro quo 
liability, the plaintiff must prove that the supervisory employee in 
fact "wielded the authority entrusted to him [by his employer] to 
subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her 
refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances. "74 
An allegation of hostile environment asserts that the employer 
has created or allows others to create unwelcome sexual conduct 
that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile 
or offensive work environment."75 Therefore, while a supervisor's 
"mere" job threat or "promise of job-related harm or benefits in 
exchange for sexual favors does not constitute quid pro quo harass­
ment, either may create or contribute to a hostile work environ­
ment."76 Conduct violative of Title VII is that which due to either 
its severity or pervasiveness creates an objectively hostile or abu­
sive work environment-"an environment that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive."77 However, "if the victim does not 
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct 
has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, 
and there is no Title VII violation."78 
Employers, under appropriate circumstances, can be liable for 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 
(1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 
1395 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job 
benefit or privilege is conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual black-mail 
and that adverse consequences follow from the employee's refusal."). 
74. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396; Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th 
Cir.) ("the employee's refusal to submit to the supervisor's sexual demands [must have] 
resulted in a tangible job detriment"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992); Hicks v. Gates 
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987). 
75. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a) (1995); See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environ­
ment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1984). 
76. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396. 
77. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("not all work place conduct 
that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employ­
ment within the meaning of TItle VII"); see Rogers v.EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th 
Cir. 1971) ("'mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive 
feelings in an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] suffi­
ciently significant degree to violate TItle VII") (quoting Henson v. City Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982», cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Henson, 682 F.2d at 
904 (for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 
"to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment"). 
78. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-72; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c), and 1606.8(c) (1995). 
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acts of sexuaP9 or racial80 harassment committed by their employ­
ees. Courts typically look to common law agency principles to de­
termine whether, under Title VII, the employer is vicariously liable 
for the conduct of its employees.81 As a general rule "[a] master is 
not subject to liability for torts of his servants acting outside the 
scope of their employment."82 However, a master may be so liable 
if "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the princi­
pal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided 
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. "83 
Vicarious liability, therefore, is appropriate when the "agent's posi­
tion facilitates the consummation of the [tort], in that from the 
point of view of the third person the [conduct] seems regular on its 
face and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the 
business confided to him."84 However, "[i]f a person has informa­
tion which would lead a reasonable man to believe that the agent is 
violating the orders of the principal or that the principal would not 
wish the agent to act under the circumstances known to the agent, 
he cannot subject the principal to liability."85 Following these 
agency principles, courts have held that if the victim knew that the 
supervisory employee's conduct was not tolerated by the employer 
and that, if reported, no adverse consequences would come to her, 
the employer is not vicariously liable.86 To avoid vicarious liability 
for conduct violative of Title VII an employer therefore must prove 
79. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57. 
80. See, e.g .• Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981). 
81. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 ("[W]e ... agree with the EEOC that Congress 
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in [determining employer liabil­
ities]. While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars 
to Title VII, Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an em­
ployer 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of 
employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. "); Gary v. 
Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957). 
83. Id. § 219(2)(d). 
84. Id. § 261 cmt. a; see also, id. § 219 cmt. e. 
85. Id. § 166 cmt. a. 
86. Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Bouton v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1994) the court stated: 
Our agency precedent requires the belief in the agent's apparent authority to 
be reasonable before the principal will be bound. This theory reconciles the 
exonerating effect of a remedial policy, which appears to stem from the exon­
erating principles of § 219(2)(b) ["the master was negligent or reckless"] with 
the apparent authority of § 219(2)(d). It also indicates that the reasonableness 
of the employee's perception of the combined message from the harasser and 
the employer is important. 
Id. 
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by act, word, and deed that it has a very strict anti-discrimination! 
anti-harassment policy that would lead a reasonable employee to 
conclude that the supervisory employee was without actual or ap­
parent authority to engage in the wrongful conduct. 
[When] an employer has taken energetic measures to discourage 
sexual harassment in the work place and has established, adver­
tised, and enforced effective procedures to deal with it when it 
does occur, [the employer] must be absolved of Title VII liability 
under a hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment. 
That defense depends, of course, on the ability of the employer 
to establish that its employees could not reasonably have failed 
to know of those measures and that its grievance procedures 
were clearly "calculated to encourage victims of harassment to 
come forward."87 
Connecticut, by statute, prohibits sexual discrimination both in 
the form of quid pro quo and hostile environment in a manner iden­
tical to federal practice.88 
c. 	 Disparate impact as a theory for wrongful discrimination 
claims 
Title VII forbids not only overt discrimination "but also prac­
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation .... Con­
gress directed the thrust of [TItle VII] to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation."89 Employment 
practices which, although facially neutral, are discriminatory in 
practice have given rise to the theory of liability known as disparate 
impact. Under this theory, a specific employment practice may be 
deemed violative of Title VII without proof of the employer's sub­
87. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 
(1986». 
88. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (1993 & West Supp. 1995) prohibits 
any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct 
of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic­
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) sub­
mission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work per­
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working 
environment. 
Id. 
89. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (where employment 
practice requiring high school diploma or passing tests operated to exclude blacks from 
employment and that practice could not be shown to be related to job performance, it 
was prohibited, notwithstanding employer's lack of discriminatory intent). 
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jective intent to discriminate.90 "[P]roof of discriminatory motive 
... is not required under a disparate-impact theory."91 
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,92 the Supreme Court out­
lined the burdens of the parties in disparate impact cases: 
Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discrimina­
tory in effect unless the employer meets "the burden of showing 
that any given requirement [has] ... a manifest relationship to 
the employment in question." This burden arises, of course, only 
after the complaining party or class has made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question 
select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern signifi­
cantly different from that of the pool of applicants. If an em­
ployer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are 
"job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show 
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesir­
able racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate in­
terest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."93 
The disparate impact theory has potential application during times 
of corporate downsizing. When employers develop a lay-off strat­
egy, they employ a facially neutral criteria that has an adverse im­
pact on a protected classification of worker. A facially neutral 
criterion such as seniority may have a disparate impact on racial 
minorities and women if those workers were late coming into the 
workforce being downsized. 
(1) Disability discrimination 
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")94 is designed to 
remove barriers which prevent qualified persons with mental or 
physical disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportuni­
ties available to persons without disabilities. Title I of the ADA 
prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disa­
bility" in connection with job application procedures, hiring, train­
ing, compensation, fringe benefits, advancement, or any other term 
90. Id.; Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
91. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 
(1977).. 
92. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
93. Id. at 425 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). See, Steven P. Croley & 
Jon D. Hanson, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 
106 HARv. L. REv. 896 (1993) for discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and how 
that act governs the burdens of proving "business necessity." 
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). 
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or condition of work.95 Title I of the ADA requires that, when an 
individual's disability creates a barrier to an employment opportu­
nity, the employer must assess whether a reasonable accommoda­
tion can be made to enable the individual to perform the essential 
functions of the job.96 
Similarly, Connecticut law prohibits employers from discrimi­
nating against persons "in compensation or in terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment because of the individual's ... present or 
past history of mental disorder, mental retardation, learning disabil­
ity or physical disability, including, but not limited to blindness."97 
(2) Age discrimination 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")98 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age.99 As a 
means of accomplishing this objective, the ADEA sets up a two-tier 
liability scheme. Section 623 constitutes the first tier and provides 
in relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer-(l) to 
fail or to refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa­
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such 
individual's age. "100 
The standard for establishing a prima facie case of age discrim­
ination under the ADEA is modeled on the standard adopted by 
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,lOl a case 
involving race discrimination under Title VII. As adapted to 
ADEA cases, the plaintiff must show that he: (1) falls within the 
protected age group, i.e., between ages 40 and 70; (2) was qualified 
for the position; (3) adverse employment actions were taken against 
him; and (4) he was replaced by a younger person.102 At this point, 
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case without presenting 
evidence of discriminatory intent. However, once the prima facie 
case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 
95. § 12112(a). 
96. § 12112(b )(5). 
97. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(1) (1993). 
98. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (Supp. V 1993). 
99. The purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em­
ployment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising 
from the impact of age on employment." § 621(b). 
100. § 623(a)(1). 
101. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
102. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1988); Wilkins v. Eaton 
Corp., 790 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. If the employer meets 
this burden of production, the plaintiff must then prove that the 
proffered reasons are pretextual.1°3 While in racial discrimination 
cases a finding of pretext evidences an intent to practice wrongful 
discrimination, in ADEA cases it does not necessarily do so. 
Congress, in our opinion, intended that liability under the 
ADEA could be established without any showing as to the de­
fendant's state of mind .... Unlike race discrimination, age dis­
crimination may simply arise from an unconscious application of 
stereotyped notions of ability rather than from a deliberate de­
sire to remove older employees from the workforce.104 
Section 626(b) of ADEA sets up a second tier of liability, sub­
jecting the employer to double damages for willful violations. !Os 
"Willful" violations sufficient to impose liquidated damages under 
the ADEA, are those where it is proved that "the employer either 
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its 
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."106 
Unless state law openly conflicts with the ADEA, the federal 
act does not preempt state law. Therefore, an employee may pur­
sue age discrimination claims based on a state constitutional, statu­
tory, or common-law theory that affords more protection or 
remedies than those provided by the ADEA. "Nothing in this 
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any state per­
forming like functions with regard to discriminatory employment 
practices on account of age except that upon commencement of ac­
tion under this chapter such action shall supersede any State ac­
tion."107 Connecticut General Statutes section 46a-60 also prohibits 
103. Oxman, 846 F.2d at 456; Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355, 357 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
104. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(citations omitted), overruled in pan by, Coston v. Plitt Theaters, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th 
Cir. 1988); see also Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989). 
105. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) incorporates § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("FLSA"), which provides that em­
ployers who violate the FLSA shall be liable to the employee in the amount of lost or 
unpaid wages "and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." § 216(b). 
106. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985); see also 
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). 
107. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also Bailey v. Container 
Corp. of Am., 594 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (state law providing for compen­
satory and punitive damages, not available under the ADEA, is not preempted; "[t]he 
Ohio legislature has, it appears, concluded that its constituency is permitted to seek 
such damages in age discrimination cases. This is not a case where State law requires 
either party 'to do precisely what the federal Act forbids them to do."'); Hulme v. 
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age discrimination. 
(3) Sexual orientation 
Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of 
sex applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender; discrimi­
nation on the basis of sexual orientation falls outside the purview of 
Title VII.lOS 
Under Connecticut law it is unlawful, "except in the case of a 
bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or 
employ or to bar or discharge from employment any individual or 
to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment because of the individual's sexual 
orientation."109 
(4) Punitive damages for wrongful discrimination 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991110 provides that a party under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, aggrieved by a respondent employer who engaged in unlawful 
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is un­
lawful because of its disparate impact) may recover punitive dam­
ages under some circumstances. To recover punitive damages, the 
complaining party must demonstrate that the respondent employer 
engaged in a discriminatory practice "with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved indi­
vidual."111 Plaintiffs may also recover compensation for "future pe­
cuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental 
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary 
losses."112 
II. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND 
In Connecticut, the insurer's obligation to defend its policy-
Barrett, 449 N.W. 2d 629 (Iowa 1989) (claim made under state law protecting persons 
under age of 40 is not preempted). 
108. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, affd without opinion, 
952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1990). 
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81c (1993). 
110. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993). See Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). 
111. § 1981a(b)(I). 
112. § 1981a(b)(3). The Act places caps on the punitive and compensatory dam­
ages depending on the size of the employer. The sum of compensatory and punitive 
damages cannot exceed $50,000 for an employer with 15 to 100 employees; $100,000 for 
an employer with 101 to 200 employees; $200,000 for an employer with 201 to 500 em­
ployees; and $300,000 for an employer with more than 500 employees. Id. 
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holder is contractual in nature and is determined by matching the 
allegations contained in the complaint with the scope of the indem­
nity coverage described in the policy. In the policy, the insurer 
agrees to "defend any 'suit' seeking ... damages because of 'bodily 
injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies."113 
Therefore, the insurer must defend the suit if the complaint states a 
claim for an injury covered by the policy. 
[1]t is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to defend; 
and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information from the 
insured, or from anyone else, which indicates, or even demon­
strates, that the injury is not in fact "covered." The insurer has 
promised to relieve the insured of the burden of satisfying the 
tribunal where the suit is tried, that the claim as pleaded is 
"groundless."114 
In Connecticut, the insurer must defend the policyholder if the 
allegations contained in the complaint "appear" to state a claim 
covered by the policy terms.115 That is, if the underlying complaint 
would permit proof of facts establishing coverage, or, put another 
away, if the complaint does not exclude the possibility of coverage, 
the insurer must defend. 
Where a complaint'in an action against one insured under such a 
policy of liability insurance states a cause of action against the 
insured which appears to bring the claimed injury within the pol­
icy coverage, it is the contractual duty of the insurer to defend 
113. ISO Fonn CG 0001 011 85, copyright 1982, 1984, [hereinafter ISO Fonn] 
section I, Coverage A., l.a. There are a number of different fonns of ISO general 
liability policies. Unless another fonn is referenced in the discussion of a particular 
case, all references in this Article will be to this fonn. 
114. Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, 
115. The insurer is relieved of its obligation to defend only if there is no possible 
factual or legal basis on which the claims could be said to be covered by the policy, or 
the allegations of the complaint are solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and 
that the conclusion is not susceptible of any other interpretation. Schwartz v. Steven­
son, 37 Conn. App. 581,584-86,657 A.2d 244, 246-47 (1995); Labonte v. Federal Mut. 
Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 255, 268 A.2d 663, 665 (1970) ("[A] duty to defend an insured 
arises if the complaint states a cause of action which appears on its face to be within the 
tenns of the policy coverage."); Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty 
& Sur. Co., 155 Conn. 104, 110, 230 A.2d 21, 24 (1967) ("The question whether the 
defendant had a duty to defend the action brought by [the plaintiff] depends on 
whether the complaint [brought] in that action stated facts which appeared to bring [the 
plaintiff's] claimed injury within the policy coverage."). Therefore, properly consid­
ered, the only two exhibits that should be examined by a court on a motion for sum­
mary judgment concerning the obligation to defend would be the complaint and the 
insurance policy. 
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the insured in the action and that duty exists regardless of the 
duty of the insurer to indemnify.116 
When the policyholder requests the insurer to defend a claim, 
the insurer must exercise its judgment as to what is required of it 
under the terms of its contractual obligation with the policyholder. 
The insurer, basically, has three options: (1) it may decide that the 
allegations do not "appear" to be covered by the policy and deny 
the request; (2) it can defend the action under a "reservation of 
rights" wherein it preserves its right to contest the obligation to in­
demnify; or (3) it can accept defense of the action without issuing a 
reservation of rights letter, thereby effectively waiving its right to 
contest the indemnity obligation.117 Under Connecticut law, an in­
surer runs a considerable downside risk should it wrongfully deny 
its policyholder a defense of a covered claim. Insurers that wrong­
fully refuse to defend effectively waive any defenses they may have 
had on the indemnity obligation. 
Where an insurer is gUilty of a breach of its contract to defend, it 
is liable to pay to the insured not only his reasonable expenses in 
conducting his own defense, but in the absence of fraud or collu­
sion, the amount of a judgment obtained against the insured up 
to the limit of liability fixed by its pOlicy.llS 
III. COVERAGE ANALYSIS 
A. Whether the Policyholder Has Alleged an Occurrence 
Under general liability policies, the insurer promises to "pay 
those sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which 
this insurance applies ... caused by an occurrence."119 The word 
"occurrence" is then defined as "an accident."12o Connecticut 
courts hold that an injury that ensues from the volitional act of a 
policyholder is an "accident" within the meaning of an insurance 
policy if the policyholder does not specifically intend to cause the 
116. Keithan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 128, 138-39, 267 
A.2d 660, 665-66 (1970). 
117. Id. at 139,267 A2d at 666; see also Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 
490, 242 A2d 695, 704 (1968). 
118. Keithan, 159 Conn. at 139, 267 A2d at 666; Schurgast, 156 Conn. at 490-91, 
242 A2d at 705; Missionaries, 144 Conn. at 113, 230 A2d at 26; Sacharko v. Center 
Equities Ltd. Partnership, 2 Conn. App. 439, 446-47, 479 A2d 1219, 1223 (1984). 
119. ISO Form, supra note 113, Section I, Coverage Al.a. 
120. ISO Form, supra note 113, Section V, 9. 
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resulting harm or is not substantially certain that such harm will 
occur. The policyholder need not intend to cause the exact extent 
of the injury that occurs, only the type or kind. The leading case, 
American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Schuss,121 states: 
"Intent" involves "(1) ... A state ofmind (2) about consequences 
of an act (or omission) and not about the act itself, and (3) it 
extends not only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to 
bring about given consequences but also to having in mind a be­
lief (or knowledge) that given consequences are substantially cer­
tain to result from the act." Also, the intentional state of mind 
must exist when the act occurs. Thus, intentional conduct "ex­
tends not only to those consequences which are desired, but also 
to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to fol­
low from what the actor does." Furthermore, "[i]t is not essential 
that the precise injury which was done be the one intended. 
Rather, it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade 
the interests of another in a way that the law forbids."122 
Similarly, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "in­
tent" refers "to the consequences of an act rather than to the act 
itself."123 "The word 'intent' ... denote[s] that the actor desires to 
cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he believes that the con­
sequences are substantially certain to result from it. "124 
[T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk, short of sub­
stantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. The defendant 
who acts in the belief of consciousness that he is causing an ap­
preciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the 
risk is great his conduct may be characterized as reckless or wan­
ton, but it is not classed as an intentional wrong. In such cases 
the distinction between intent and negligence obviously is a mat­
ter of degree. Apparently the line has been drawn by the courts 
at the point where the known danger ceases to be only a foresee­
able risk which a reasonable man would avoid, and becomes a 
substantial certainty.125 
121. 221 Conn. 768, 607 A.2d 418 (1992). 
122. Id. at 776, 607 A.2d at 422 (citations omitted). 
123. 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A emt. a (1965). 
124. Id. § 8A. 
125.. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 103,491 A.2d 368, 375 (1985) (quot­
ing Keeting v. Shell Chern. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1980»; American Nat'l Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 776, 607 A.2d 418, 422 (1992) ("Although in a given 
case there may be doubt about whether one acted intentionally or negligently, the dif­
ference in meaning is clear. 'As Holmes observed, even a dog knows the difference 
between being tripped over and being kicked."'). 
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Essentially, there are three classes of allegations for which an 
insurer may deny coverage on the grounds that the allegations 
made by the underlying plaintiff do not allege an "occurrence." 
First are those cases in which the employee specifically alleges that 
the employer acted with the intent to harm the employee. Second 
would be where intent to harm is an essential element of the cause 
of action alleged by the employee. Third would be allegations in 
which intent to harm may not be an essential element of the cause 
of action, but where the very nature of the wrongful act is laden 
with an intent to cause injury. Our task, then, is to examine the 
various causes of action available to employees and determine 
whether or not they may allege an "occurrence." 
1. Wrongful Termination of At-Will Employees 
In Connecticut, the tort of wrongful termination requires that 
the employee plead and prove "a demonstrably improper reason 
for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some im­
portant violation of public policy."126 Furthermore, "for the dis­
charge to be actionable there must be more than an incidental 
effect on public policy. The defendant's reason for discharging the 
plaintiff must contravene public policy. "127 
There is no reported case construing Connecticut law on this 
issue. However, analogous precedent comes from the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In Providence 
Washington Insurance Group v. Albarello,128 the employer sought 
coverage for a claim brought by a former employee alleging that 
the employer had breached a five-year employment contract by ter­
minating his employment without just cause. The employee also 
alleged that, as the direct and proximate result of such discharge, he 
"suffered a loss of morale, confidence, and/or self-esteem, humilia­
tion, nervousness, anxiety and mental distress, which has resulted in 
severe mental and physical injury."129 The employer made demand 
on the insurer that it defend it against the claims and indemnify it 
for any loss under its general liability policy. The insurer denied 
coverage on the grounds that the alleged damages were not caused 
by an "occurrence," that is, they were not caused by "an accident, 
126. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 385, 386­
87 (1980). 
127. Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 497-98, 523 A.2d 
1356, 1362, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987). 
128. 784 F. Supp. 950 (D. Conn. 1992). 
129. Id. at 952. 
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including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which re­
sults in bodily damage or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the Insured."130 
In its opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the em­
ployer sought to create a genuine issue of material fact by filing an 
affidavit in which the employer swore that it was neither its purpose 
nor expectation that the underlying plaintiff would "suffer severe 
mental and physical injuries as a result of his discharge from em­
ployment."131 That is, the employer denied any subjective intent to 
do the employee harm, averring that any harm done was caused by 
an accident. 
Judge Cabranes granted summary judgment in favor of the in­
surer, ruling that the allegations did not constitute an "occurrence" 
because: (1) the discharge was a "concededly intended event[]" 
and therefore not an accident; and (2) because wrongful termina­
tion of employment is so inherently injurious, the party intention­
ally discharging the employee must have intended the mental or 
emotional distress flowing from the act.132 
The court also had practical considerations in mind when rul­
ing that, despite the insured's protestations to the contrary, the ob­
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 954. The court relied on Jespersen v. United States Fidelity & Guar­
anty Co., 131 N.H. 257,261,551 A.2d 530,533 (1988), which came to the same conclu­
sion on substantially identical facts. In that case the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
held that the affidavit filed in opposition purporting to claim that the employer in­
tended no harm was "of no consequence" because some degree of mental and physical 
distress was the "natural consequence" of losing one's job. Id. at 533 (quoting Provider 
Washington Ins. Group v. Albarello, 784 F. Supp. 950, 954 (D. Conn. 1992». See also 
Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988) 
(holding that emotional and mental injury is an intended or expected consequence of 
employment termination); Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 
86 A.D.2d 736, 737, 446 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (3d Dept. 1982), which stated: 
If, in fact, plaintiff discharged Kathleen Wood from her employment because 
of her disability, it cannot be said that the mental and emotional injuries al­
leged by the Woods as flowing directly from plaintiff's intentional discrimina­
tory practice were unexpected and unforeseen by plaintiff, the insured. While 
it is not legally impossible to find accidental results flowing from intentional 
causes, Le., that the resulting damage was unintended although the original act 
or acts leading to the damage were intentional such is not the case here, for 
the damages alleged in the Woods' complaint are the intended result which 
flows directly and immediately from plaintiff's intentional act, rather than aris­
ing out of a chain of unintended though foreseeable events that occurred after 
the intentional act. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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jectively foreseeable consequences of an act must be deemed to 
have been intended. The court stated: 
Under the theory advocated by defendants, an insured could will­
fully breach a contract and then claim entitlement to insurance­
funded defense on the theory that he did not desire or expect 
that the party bringing suit on the contract would suffer any dam­
ages. . . . In such circumstances the possibility of collusion be­
tween the insured and the party ostensibly bringing suit against 
him cannot be discounted especially in view of the fact that, in 
contrast to many tort suits, the parties to a contract dispute or a 
wrongful discharge claim are already acquainted and thus better 
situated to collude.133 
Therefore, while there are no Connecticut cases on point, substan­
tial authority from other jurisdictions-including the local federal 
district construing the law of Connecticut-holds that wrongful ter­
mination is inherently injurious and that intent to harm will be in­
ferred, as a matter of law. 
2. Sexual Harassment 
As set forth earlier in this article sexual harassment may take 
either of two forms: quid pro quo (supervisory employee uses 
power to induce subordinate to grant sexual favors in return for 
employment benefits) or hostile environment (creating an objec­
tively hostile or abusive work environment). 
No Connecticut court has ruled whether a claim of sexual har­
assment, under either form, is an "occurrence." It is likely, how­
ever, that the courts would hold that: (1) claims of direct 
harassment or quid pro quo harassment against the employee who 
commits the offense would not constitute an occurrence; (2) claims 
made against an employer for negligently failing to supervise or for 
hiring employees who commit quid pro quo harassment would con­
stitute an occurrence; and (3) claims made against employers based 
on the hostile environment theory probably would constitute an 
occurrence. 
With respect to claims of direct harassment or quid pro quo 
harassment against the employee who commits the offense, most 
courts hold that intent to injure is inferred from commission of the 
act. That is, the sexual misconduct is objectively so certain to cause 
harm that the alleged bodily injury or personal injury is deemed to 
be "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured as a 
133. Albarel/o, 784 F. Supp. at 955. 
1996] EMPLOYMENT-RELATED LITIGATION IN CONNECTICUT 227 

matter of law."134 In Continental Insurance Co. v. McDaniel,135 the 
employee in the underlying complaint alleged that her supervisor 
sexually harassed her by touching and fondling her, using vulgar 
language, and calling her at home. She also alleged attendant torts 
of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the complaint did not al­
lege an occurrence under the employer's policy because: 
The conduct of [the employer] was so certain to cause injury to 
McDaniel that his intent to cause harm is inferred as a matter of 
law, despite his statements to the contrary that all he intended 
was to provide pleasure and satisfaction.... [O]nce one inten­
tionally commits an act against another and injury results as a 
natural and probable consequence of the intentional act, the in­
jury is intended and expected and therefore excluded from 
coverage.136 
The inferred intent doctrine employed in sexual harassment 
cases is substantially similar to that employed in Albarello, in which 
Judge Cabranes held, as a matter of law, that discharge from em­
ployment was inherently injurious and that any emotional distress 
flowing from that act was intentionally caused. It is likely that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, if presented with the opportunity, 
would adopt the inferred intent doctrine in direct harassment and 
quid pro quo claim against the offending employee. 
It is common in direct harassment and quid pro quo cases for 
the employee to sue the employer as well as the abusive supervising 
employee. Since the alleged abuser often has scant means with 
134. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. 
Q. App. 1993); see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249, 253­
54 (W.D. Ark. 1992) ("[I]t strains the imagination to speculate how a pattern of sexual 
overtures and touching can be 'accidental.' ... [A]ny injury alleged to have been sus­
tained by the [employee] was not the result of an 'occurrence' as defined in the pol­
icy."); Sena v. 1tavelers Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 471, 476 (D.N.M. 1992) ("[The employee] 
alleges sexual misconduct, done voluntarily and deliberately, resulting in emotional dis­
tress. I find that the insured's intent to harm can be inferred as a matter of law in cases 
involving sexual misconduct."). See also Old Republic Ins. v. Comprehensive Health 
Care, 786 F. Supp. 629, 633 (N.D. Tex. 1992), affd, 2 F.3d 105 (1993), which said that: 
[T]he court finds that the insurers in this case did not have a duty to defend 

the underlying litigation that arose out of petitioners' claims of sexual harass­

. ment. Such claims allege intentional acts that are not "occurrences" for the 

purpose of policy coverage and there is no policy provision that creates a duty 

. to defend under the facts of this case. 
Id. 
135. 772 P.2d 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 
136. Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
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which to compensate the victim, the insured employer is usually 
targeted, on the grounds that the employer negligently hired or su­
pervised the abuser. With respect to those claims, insurers are gen­
erally obligated to provide coverage to the employer because the 
claimant alleged only negligence against the employer and because 
the intent of one insured cannot be imputed to another.137 In those 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the harm inflicted by the abu­
sive supervisor "was expected or intended from the standpoint of 
the employer. "138 For the injury to be expected or intended, the 
employer must have been "substantially certain"139 that bodily in­
jury or personal injury would result from its acts. 
By contrast, negligent hiring or supervising does not necessar~ 
ily connote that the employer intends its employees to inflict harm 
and could therefore constitute an "occurrence" under the insured's 
policy. Similarly, allegations against an employer for hostile envi­
ronment discrimination are probably also susceptible of constitut­
ing an 'occurrence' under Connecticut law. By definition, a hostile 
environment exists when the employer has created or allows others 
to create sexual conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unrea­
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance."140 It is 
inherent in the definition of the cause of action that unwelcome 
sexual conduct may unintentionally create a hostile work environ­
ment. Consequently, it is possible that an employer could allow a 
hostile environment to exist without purposefully intending to 
cause harm. 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
No Connecticut case law exists as to whether causes of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress may constitute ali 
"occurrence" within the meaning of a general liability policy. The 
issue, of course, is whether intent to harm is an inherent element of 
the cause of action. In Connecticut, one element of the cause of 
action is that "the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or 
137. However, when a policy uses language referring to the expectation or intent 
of "an insured" or "any insured," courts may deny coverage to other insureds as well. 
138. ISO Form, supra note 113, section I, 2.a. ("This insurance does not apply to 
a. 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured."). 
139. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 777, 607 A.2d 418, 423 
(1992). 
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1995) (emphasis added). The Connecticut statute 
that prohibits "hostile environment" in the workplace employs identical language. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (1993). 
1996] EMPLOYMENT-RELATED LITIGATION IN CONNECTICUT 229 

that he knew or should.have known that the emotional distress was 
a likely result of his conduct. "141 If the definition were limited to 
the first clause, i.e., "the actor intended to inflict emotional dis­
tress,"142 the resolution would be simple-there is no occurrence. 
However, an employee can· recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by mere!y proving that the employer "knew or 
should have known that the emotional distress was a likely result of 
his conduct."143 Standing alone, this requirement would not seem 
to meet the high standard necessary to constitute "intent" under 
Connecticut law: 
The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that he is 
causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, 
and if the risk is great his conduct may be characterized as reck­
less or wanton, but it is not classed as an intentional wrong .... 
[T]he line [is] drawn by the courts at the point where the known 
danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable 
man would avoid, and becomes a substantial certainty,144 
The "knew or should have known" standard that "emotional dis­
tress was a likely result of his conduct" does not even constitute 
recklessness,145 let alone the "substantial certainty" standard neces­
sary to prove intent,146 
However, another element of the cause of action is that the 
actor's conduct must have been "so outrageous in character and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community."147 Arguably, "substantial certainty" that harm will re­
sult, is inherent in the kind of "atrocious and utterly intolerable" 
behavior sufficient to sustain a cause of action for intentional inflic­
tion of emotional distress. When conduct is sufficiently "inherently 
141. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243,253,510 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1986). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91,103,491 A.2d 368, 376 (1985) (quot­
ing Keeting v. Shell Chern. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1980)). See also American 
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 607 A.2d 418 (1992). 
145. "Recklessness" requires that the actor should "realize that there is a strong 
probability that harm may result." 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f 
(1965) (emphasis added). 
146. Mingachos, 196 Conn. at 103,491 A.2d at 376. 
147. Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn. Supp. 17,20,597 A.2d 846, 847-48 
(1991) ("Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of facts to an average mem­
ber of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to 
exclaim, 'Outrageous!"') (quoting 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. [d)). 
See also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 254 n.5, 510 A.2d 1337, 1342 n.5 (1986). 
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injurious," the actor is deemed to have intended the harm caused 
by it.148 
In the absence of any definitive Connecticut case law as to 
whether the "atrocious and utterly intolerable" element of the in­
tentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action connotes 
"inherently injurious" conduct, as a matter of law, insurers have no 
firm assurance that they can deny a defense of such a claim with 
impunity. 
4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
mayor may not be within the meaning of the word "occurrence" as 
used in a general liability policy, depending on the factual circum­
stances that give rise to the allegations. By definition, a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress would seem to be an acci­
dent resulting in harm neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured. The elements of the cause of action do 
not require the "substantial certainty" that the plaintiff would suffer 
harm as the proximate result of his act.149 
However, if the claim arose out of a wrongful discharge, it 
would seem that, notwithstanding how the plaintiff characterized 
the nature of the claim, the injury was a substantially certain result 
of the discharge. Because a wrongful termination of employment is 
so inherently injurious, the party intentionally discharging the em­
ployee must have intended the mental or emotional distress flowing 
from the act.150 Therefore, if Connecticut courts follow Judge 
Cabranes' lead, insurers should not be obligated to defend or in­
demnify policyholders for "negligent" infliction of emotional dis­
tress caused by means of a wrongful discharge. 
5. Disparate Treatment 
There exists no Connecticut case law on the issue as to whether 
allegations of disparate treatment under the Civil Rights Act of 
148. See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Group v. Albarello, 784 F. Supp. 950, 
952 (D. Conn. 1992); Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276 
(Mont. 1988); Jespersen v. United States Fidelity Co., 131 N.H. 257, 551 A.2d 530 
(1988); Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home v. Fireman's Ins., 446 N.Y.S.2d 599 (3d Dept. 
1982). 
149. The plaintiff need only prove that the defendant's "conduct involved an un­
reasonable risk of causing [emotional] distress." Montinieri v. Southern New England 
Thl. Co., 175 Conn. 337,345,398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (1978). 
150. Albarello, 784 F. Supp. at 954 (citing Jespersen, 131 N.H. at 261, 551 A.2d at 
533). 
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1964 or Connecticut General Statutes section 46a-60 constitute an 
"occurrence" under a general liability policy. However, the major­
ity of jurisdictions that have considered the issue hold that it is not 
an occurrence because disparate treatment claims require proof of 
discriminatory intent.151 To prove "disparate treatment," a plaintiff 
must show that an employer treated an individual employee or 
group of employees differently because of sex, race, age, religion, or 
some other improper differentiation. Discriminatory motive is an 
essential element of the cause of action.152 
It is difficult to imagine a fact situation where an intent to harm 
would not necessarily be implied from an intentionally discrimina­
tory act. That is, intentional discriminatory acts are so inherently 
injurious that the party intentionally discriminating against its em­
ployees must be charged with intending the adverse conse­
quences.153 It is likely that, if given the opportunity, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court would hold that claims of disparate 
treatment on the basis of age, sex, race, religion, or national origin, 
which as a matter of law require a finding of "discriminatory in­
tent," do not constitute an "occurrence." 
6. Disparate Impact 
No Connecticut case law exists regarding whether a claim of 
disparate impact under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Connecticut 
General Statutes section 46a-60 constitutes an "occurrence." 
Courts in other jurisdictions generally hold that disparate impact 
claims are susceptible of constituting an occurrence because, unlike 
disparate treatment claims, there is no requirement that discrimina­
tory intent be proved.154 In contrast to disparate treatment claims, 
151. E.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial Ins., 417 Mass. 
757,763,633 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1994); School Dist. 1, Multnomah County v. Mission Ins. 
Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 650 P.2d 929 (1982); E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 901, 905, 726 P.2d 439, 442 (1986). 
152. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) 
("[The plaintiff's] burden [is to persuade] the trier of fact that the defendant intention­
ally discriminated against the plaintiff."); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
577-78 (1978) ("TItle VII prohibits [an employer] from having as a goal a work force 
selected by any proscribed discriminatory practice."); International Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive is 
critical. "). 
153. Albarello, 784 F. Supp. at 954. 
154. See, e.g., Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1540 (D. 
Kan. 1993); Solo Cup Co., 619 F.2d at 1187-88; Union Camp Co. v. Continental Casu­
alty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (S.D. Ga. 1978); see also Effie Florence Anastassiou, 
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disparate impact claims focus on the consequences of the em­
ployer's actions, not his intent.155 Employers may be liable under 
the disparate impact theory without proof that the employer "in­
tend[ed] to bring about a result which [WOUld] invade the interests 
of another in a way that the law forbids"156 or that the employer 
"desire[d] to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believe[d] 
that the consequences [were] substantially certain to follow from 
it."157 Therefore, under Connecticut's duty-to-defend standard, in 
the absence of some other policy defense, an insurer may not deny 
its policyholder a defense for a claim of discriminatory impact 
based upon lack of an "occurrence." The insurer, however, may 
very well desire to defend the action under a reservation of rights 
because the trial of the action may indeed turn on the employer's 
discriminatory intent.158 While the employee establishes a prima 
facie case by proving that a facially-neutral job requirement has an 
adverse impact on a protected group,159 the burden then shifts to 
the employer to prove that the requirement is job-related, in that it 
bears a "manifest relationship to the employment in question. "160 
If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff can still prevail by 
Comment, Insurance Against Civil Liability for Employment Discrimination, 80 
COLUM. L. REv. 192, 199-203 (1980). 
155. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,328-29 (1977) ("The gist of [a 
disparate impact claim] does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory mo­
tive.... [R]ather, [the gist is] that ... facially neutral qualification standards work in 
fact disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for employment. "); Interna­
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not 
required under a disparate-impact theory."). 
156. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 776, 607 A.2d 418, 422 
(1992) (quoting KEETON ET AL. supra note 38, § 36. 
157. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
158. At least one commentator has observed that in many, if not most, disparate 
impact cases the employer, in fact, has intentionally discriminated against certain of its 
employees. Steven L. Willbom, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment Discrimina­
tion, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003, 1010 (1982): 
Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, disparate impact cases may 
be intent-based. Although Title VII plaintiffs do not have to prove discrimina­
tory intent to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, it 
does not follow that discriminatory intent is always absent. Rather, it is 
equally, if not more, plausible that discriminatory intent is present but 
unproven. 
Id. 
159. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlin­
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
160. Griggs,401 U.S. at 432; see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 
U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979) (policy against employing narcotics users); Dothard, 433 
U.S. at 329 (height and weight requirements); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 425 (1975) (program of employment testing). 
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demonstrating that another requirement "without a similarly unde­
sirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate in­
terest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship_"'161 The United 
States Supreme Court has stated that "[s]uch a showing would be 
evidence that the employer was using its [facially neutral job re­
quirement] merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination_"162 "Pretext," 
of course, involves an intent to cleverly camouflage illegal discrimi­
natory intent.163 Therefore, a "discriminatory impact" case may 
play itself out to be one of discriminatory treatment, and the insurer 
ultimately may be able to deny indemnity coverage (but not de­
fense) on the grounds that there was not an "occurrence." 
7. Violation of the ADEA 
No Connecticut case law exists regarding whether a claim of 
age discrimination under the ADEA or Connecticut General Stat­
ute section 46a-60 is reasonably susceptible of constituting an "oc­
currence." However, examination of the elements of proof 
necessary to state a cause of action under either section 623 or sec­
tion 626(b) of the ADEA suggests that the employer need not in­
tend to cause harm to the employee to state a claim; therefore, in 
the absence of another coverage defense, the insurer will owe the 
employer a defense of the claim. 
To establish liability under Section 623, the plaintiff need not 
prove that the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of 
age. An ADEA plaintiff establishes "tier one" liability by use of 
the burden-shifting method of proof adopted from McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,l64 a Title VII case. Since the claim is sus­
ceptible to proof without a showing of intent to harm, the claim 
alleges an "occurrence," and the insurer must defend. Further­
more, unlike disparate impact cases involving race discrimination, a 
showing that the employer used a facially-neutral job requirement 
as a pretext for discrimination does not necessarily connote discrim­
inatory intent.165 Therefore, unlike a racial discrimination case, an 
161. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). 
162. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). 
163. Menzel v. Western Auto Supply Co., 848 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir. 1988) (The 
"finding of pretext is the equivalent of a finding that the employer intentionally 
discriminated. "). 
164. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
165. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1981) 
("It is not the case, as the plaintiff contends, that because the jury might reasonably 
have inferred that [defendant's] post-hoc justifications for its actions were pretextual, 
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action under section 626(b) is not susceptible of "playing-out" to 
become a case involving proof of discriminatory intent and outside 
indemnity coverage (on that basis alone). 
To impose liability resulting in double damages under the sec­
ond tier liability scheme provided in section 626(b), the employee 
must allege and prove that "the employer either knew qr showed 
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohib­
ited by the ADEA."l66 This standard, however, does not require 
that the employee prove that the employer intended to cause the 
employee harm. Under Connecticut law, "recklessness" is not in­
tentional behavior; it is an accident, and therefore the claim is sus­
ceptible to coming within the coverage of the policy. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court has stated: 
Alleged misconduct deemed to be "reckless," ... differs from 
intentional misconduct. "While an act to be reckless must be in­
tended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm 
which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from facts 
which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability 
that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that 
his conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong probability is 
a different thing from a substantial certainty without which he 
cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act results."167 
Therefore, claims under either section 623 or 626(b) of the 
ADEA are susceptible of coming within the coverage of the 
policy.168 
the evidence necessarily compels the inference that the defendant acted consciously."}, 
overruled in part by, Coston v. Plitt Theaters, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); Burlew 
v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1989). 
166. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985) (quoting 
Airline Pilots Assoc., Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 
1983)}. 
167. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 103,491 A.2d 368, 376 (1985) (quot­
ing 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 500 emt. f (1965}). 
168. Not all courts agree. In Kline v. The Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. '123 (M.D. 
Pa. 1993), affd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994), the court held that an age discrimination 
claim did not constitute an occurrence: "[The employee] alleges that his employment 
was terminated by [the employer] on the basis of his age. Termination of an employee's 
employment is obviously an intentional act. By no stretch of the imagination could it be 
considered an accidental or unintended consequence of one's conduct." Id. at 129. The 
court, however, did not examine the elements of a private cause of action under the 
ADEA, specifically, the fact that intent to discriminate or cause harm is not a required 
element. 
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B. Whether the Policyholder Has Alleged Bodily Injury 
In general liability policies, insurers agree to "pay those sums 
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages be­
cause of ... 'bodily injury"'169 Typically, the policies define "bodily 
injury" as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time resulting 
therefrom."17o While it is possible that a physical bodily injury 
could be involved in an employment claim,171 most such claims 
make allegations of non-physical injuries such as mental or emo­
tional distress. The issue, then, is whether claims of mental or emo­
tional distress constitute "bodily injury." 
No Connecticut case law exists that precisely answers the issue 
as to whether emotional distress constitutes a bodily injury within 
the meaning of a general liability policy. Cases from other jurisdic­
tions are divided, the majority restricting its meaning of "bodily in­
jury" to physical injury only and excluding non-physical harm such 
as emotional distress.172 These cases typically find that the defini­
tion is unambiguous and that the word "bodily" (connoting a physi­
cal harm) modifies "injury," "sickness" and "disease."173 Other 
169. . ISO Form, supra note 113, Section I, La. 
170. ISO Form, supra note 113, Section V, 3. 
171. Physical bodily injury can occur in sexual or racial harassment cases as the 
result of a battery. There is no dispute that a physical bodily injury constitutes a "bodily 
injury" under a policy. 
172. See, e.g., Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1540,1548­
49 (D. Kan. 1993) (pain, humiliation and embarrassment caused by employment termi­
nation is not "bodily injury"); American and Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Schools in the 
Diocese of Virginia, 645 F. Supp. 628, 632-33 (E.D. Va. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 285,287-88 (D. Wyo. 1985) (no 
duty to defend under "bodily injury" coverage where party "not suing for a physical 
injury or disease."); Rolette County v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 452 F. Supp. 125, 
130 (D.N.D. 1978) (insurer under no duty to defend where only damages for humilia­
tion and emotional distress are sought); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654, 
658,518 N.E.2d 1154,1157 (1988) ("As a general rule, other jurisdictions have found 
the term 'bodily injury' to be unambiguous and understood to mean hurt or harm to the 
human body, contemplating actual physical harm or damage to the human body.") 
(quoting Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoag, 136 Mich. O. App. 326, 334, 356 N.W.2d 
630, 633 (1984». 
173. E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 901, 
907-08,726 P.2d 439, 443 (1986): 
The coverage contemplated actual bodily injury, sickness or disease resulting 
in physical impairment, as contrasted to mental impairment. Under the 'frav­
elers policy the terms "sickness" and "disease" are modified by the word 
"bodily." Mental anguish and illness and emotional distress are not covered 
by the express terms of the Travelers policy. 
Id. 
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courts, however, have held that the term "bodily injury" is ambigu­
ous, or at least broad enough to lead a reasonable policyholder to 
believe that it was purchasing coverage for emotional distressP4 
For example, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that a 
claim for emotional distress, with no accompanying physical mani­
festations, is included within "bodily injury" coverage because the 
definition of this term was ambiguous.175 The court of appeals de­
termined that the word "bodily" did not necessarily modify "sick­
ness" or "disease," and therefore, nonphysical sicknesses or 
diseases were within the coverage. "We decline to rewrite the con­
tract to add 'bodily sickness' and bodily disease, and a requirement 
for prior physical contact for compensable mental injury."176 
The Connecticut Supreme Court appears to be leaning toward 
restricting the meaning of "bodily injury" to physical harm and ex­
cluding emotional distress from "bodily injury" coverage. In Izzo v. 
Colonial Pennsylvania Insurance Co. ,177 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court appeared to adopt the reasoning contained in cases from 
other jurisdictions that distinguish the meanings of "bodily injury" 
and "personal injury," suggesting that the policy term "personal in­
jury" is "broader, more comprehensive and significant than the 
term 'bodily injury."'178 The court also noted that "[i]t has been 
said that the term 'bodily injury' ... is narrower in that it connotes 
an element of personal contact."179 The opinion, though, appears 
to be carefully crafted so as not to stand for the proposition that 
emotional distress is outside the scope of the meaning of bodily in­
jury, and the issue should still be considered to be unresolved under 
Connecticut law.180 
C. Whether the Policyholder Has Alleged Personal Injury 
The terms "bodily injury" and "personal injury" are generally 
174. E.g., Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sunbelt Beer, Distribs., Inc., 839 
F. Supp. 376, 379 (D.S.C. 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 295 s.c. 349, 
350,368 S.E.2d 477, 478 (Ct. App.), affd. per curiam, 297 S.C. 71,374 S.E.2d 896 (1988) 
(under South Carolina law, emotional distress is within meaning of bodily injury). See 
also GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 44:287 (2d ed. 
Rhodes rev. 1982). 
175. Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co., 79 N.Y.2d 623, 595 N.E.2d 819 
(1992). 
176. [d. at 630,595 N.E.2d at 822. 
177. 203 Conn. 305,524 A.2d 641 (1987). 
178. [d. at 313,524 A.2d at 645. 
179. [d. (citing Malone v. Costa, 9 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1942». 
180. The court did go so far as to say that "[a] claim of loss of consortium, 
although a 'personal injury,' is not a 'bodily injury' to the claimant." [d. 
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recognized as not being synonymous and as having distinct defini­
tions.181 The term "personal injury" is generally regarded as being 
broader than "bodily injury" and includes not only physical injury 
but also affronts or insults to the reputation or sensibilities of a per­
son. "Bodily injury," by comparison, is a narrower term and ap­
pears to encompass only physical injury to the body and the 
consequences thereof. 
General liability policies typically define "personal injury" as: 
injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising out of one or more of 
the following offenses: a. False arrest, detention or imprison­
ment; b. Malicious prosecution; c. Wrongful entry into or evic­
tion of a person from a room, dwelling or premises that the 
person occupies; d. Oral or written publication· of material that 
slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a per­
son's or organizations goods, products or services; or e. Oral or 
written, publication or material that violates a person's right of 
privacy.182 
While there is no Connecticut case law on the subject, the defi­
nition of "personal injury" in the general liability policy appears to 
include negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation183 
if the employer's liability is purely vicarious. Further, even if a def­
amation claim alleges that it was made "with reckless disregard," 
"falsely and maliciously," or "with malice" such statements do not 
necessarily connote "an intent or desire to injure"l84 and, therefore, 
cause the claim to be outside coverage of the policy. If the em­
ployee were to claim that the employer defamed him with the spe­
cific intent to injure his reputation or hold him up to ridicule, then 
the defamation would not be an "accident" and the claim would not 
be within the scope of the policy. 
D. Whether the Policyholder Has Alleged Property Damage 
General liability policies typically define "property damage" 
as: "a. physical injury to tangible property including all loss of use 
181. See 7A JOHN A. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4501.14 
(Berdel ed. 1979); see also Izzo, 203 Conn. at 313, 524 A.2d at 645. 
182. ISO Form, supra note 113, Section V, 9. 
183. See French Cleaners Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. CV 92 051 82 
85,1995 WL 91423 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1995), in which the court strongly implies 
that, had the employee included a defamation claim in connection with her wrongful 
discharge action, the defamation claim would have fallen within the definition of "per­
sonal injury" and thus triggered the insurer's duty to defend. 
184. Haxhi v. Moss, 25 Conn. App. 16,20, 591 A.2d 1275, 1277 (1991). 
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of that property; or b. loss of use of tangible property that is not 
physically injured. "185 
The question arises, then, as to whether an aggrieved em­
ployee's allegations of loss of past and future salary, loss of health 
benefits, seniority, pension benefits, and other incidents of employ­
ment as a result of an alleged discriminatory wrongful discharge 
may constitute "property damage." 
While there is no Connecticut case law on this issue, cases from 
other jurisdictions uniformly hold that such claims do not involve 
"tangible property" and therefore do not constitute property 
damage. 
Understood in its plain and ordinary sense, "tangible property" 
means "property" (as real estate) having physical substance ap­
parent to the senses. To construe the explicit words "tangible 
property" to include intangible economic interests and property 
rights requires a strained and farfetched interpretation, doing vi­
olence to the plain language of the policies. Such an interpreta­
tion would rewrite the policies to fasten on the insurers a liability 
they have not assumed.186 
Therefore, those courts that have considered the issue hold 
that the purely economic losses claimed by aggrieved employees in 
wrongful discharge or discrimination cases (e.g., lost salary, death 
benefits, etc.) are not "tangible property" and therefore are not 
covered by a general liability pOlicy.187 If presented with the issue, 
it is very likely that the Connecticut Supreme Court would reach a 
similar result. 
185. ISO Fonn, supra note 113, section V, 12. 
186. Giddings v. Industrial Indem. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980); See also Lamar Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 757 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1988) ("[T]angible property is that which is capable of being handled, touched, or 
physically possessed."). 
187. Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distribs., Inc., 839 F. 
Supp. 376, 379 (D.S.C. 1993); Lamar, 757 P.2d at 1144 (loss of pay, retirement, medical 
and other benefits by employees in sexual discrimination suits are "purely economic" 
and do not constitute damage to, or loss of use of tangible property). See also Mutual 
Servo Casualty Ins. CO. V. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (D. Mont. 
1988) reasoning that: 
[The employee's] complaint alleges loss of "past and future salary, loss of 
health benefits, and other benefits of employment," as a direct result of the 
alleged wrongful discharge. In this court's opinion, [the employee's] alleged 
damages do not involve tangible property and, therefore, any sums [the em­
pIoyer] might become obligated to pay in the underlying action would not be a 
result of "property damage" as defined in the subject policy. 
Id. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. V. First Sec. Bank, 662 F. Supp. 1126, 1129-30 (D. Mont. 
1987). 
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E. 	 Whether Employers May Obtain Insurance Coverage for 
Punitive Damages 
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, punitive damages may be 
assessed if the defendant employer committed a discriminatory 
practice with "reckless indifference to the federally protected rights 
of an aggrieved individual."188 Punitive damages awards can be 
quite substantial, especially if the discriminatory practice was di­
rected to a class of persons rather than to a single individual. When 
the employer/policyholder makes a claim against its insurer for cov­
erage of such punitive damages, how should the insurer respond? 
As in all coverage matters, the threshold inquiry is an examina­
tion of the policy language. There are at least three ways in which 
the policy may treat punitive damages. First, the policy may ex­
pressly exclude coverage, in which case resolution of the issue is 
simple. Second, the policy may be silent, that is, the policy may 
simply state that the insurer agrees "to pay those sums that the in­
sured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bod­
ily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies"189 
and the phrase "punitive damages" never appears in the policy. 
Third, the policy may purport to expressly cover punitive damages, 
that is, it may state that the word "damages" wherever used in the 
policy shall include actual damages or statutory damages and shall 
also include punitive damages. 
In those cases where the policy is silent, that is, when it states 
that the insurer will pay on behalf of the insured all sums that the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of an occurrence, and 
there is no exclusion for punitive damages, the insurer must un­
dergo a two-step process. The first is an analysis of the policy lan­
guage itself to determine whether it admits of an interpretation 
which would permit coverage. Second, if the language does admit 
such an interpretation, the insurer must determine whether cover­
age for punitive damages would be void as being contrary to public 
policy. In those cases where the policy expressly purports to cover 
punitive damages, the insurer, somewhat awkwardly, is left with 
only the public policy issue. 
188. 	 42 U.S.c. § 1981(b)(1) (1988). 
189. 	 ISO Fonn, supra note 113, section I, Coverage A.1a. 
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1. Policy Interpretation 
Some courts hold that punitive damages are not damages "be­
cause of bodily injury" or "personal injury" but, rather, are imposed 
based on conduct society desires to reform; therefore, they are not 
included within the meaning of "damages." 
Punitive damages are not in the same category as damages "for 
bodily injury" or "for personal injury." "The chief purpose of 
punitive damages is punishment to the offender, and a deterrent 
to similar conduct by others." Punitive damages are never 
awarded as compensation. They "are mere incidents to the cause 
of action and are c~nsidered separate and apart from and in addi­
tion to the assessment of actual damages." While actual damages 
are measured by the extent of the injury, punitive damages are 
measured by the extent of the malice of the actor. Since punitive 
damages are never awarded merely because of a "bodily injury" 
or "personal injury" but only when the actor's conduct displays 
the requisite malice, we find that they are not in the category of 
damages for "bodily injury" or "personal injury."190 
The majority of courts, however, disagree, holding that puni­
tive damages are covered within the scope 'of the policy language or 
conclude that the language is ambiguous and employ the doctrine 
of contra proferentem to construe the policy in favor of coverage.191 
For example, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hartford Acci­
dent & Indemnity Co. ,192 the court reasoned: 
Of course, a threshold question may be posed, whether the lan­
guage of the insurance contract admits of a construction which 
allows for punitive damages. The contract covers "all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay." ... The con­
tract nowhere mentions punitive damages, although it was within 
Hartford's power to exclude such coverage. The policy unam­
biguously covers "all sums." Punitive damages are a form of 
damages; when liquidated by judgment, they are a "sum." Thus, 
the contract does not even present such an ambiguity as would 
190. Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 206, 209-10 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted). See also Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 27 
N.C. App. 698, 702, 220 S.E.2d 403, 406 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. 
Wyant, 474 N.W.2d 514, 515 (S.D. 1991). 
191. E.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 
92, 94 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 
(S.D. Me. 1972); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire & Ins. Co., 95 
Idaho 501, 507, 511 P.2d 783, 789 (1973); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 
204, 567 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1977). 
192. Norfolk, 420 F. Supp. at 95. 
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call into play the rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts 
should be resolved in favor of the insured.193 
Similarly, in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co. ,194 the Supreme 
Court of Oregon stated that: 
in the absence of an express exclusion of liability for punitive 
damages, a person insured by such a policy would have reason to 
suppose that he would be protected against liability for "all 
sums" which the insured might become "legally obligated to pay" 
and that the term "damages" would include all damages, includ­
ing punitive damages which became, by judgment, a "sum" that 
he became "legally obligated to pay."195 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has resolved the contract in­
terpretation issue in favor of the policyholder. In Avis Rent A Car 
System, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,196 the court held that 
the policy provision indemnifying the policyholder for "all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of ... bodily injury" can reasonably be construed to in­
clude a judgment trebling a compensatory damages award because 
of the reckless nature of the conduct that produced the bodily in­
jury.197 Liberty Mutual argued that the policy term "damages be­
cause of ... bodily injury" did not include damages assessed as a 
statutory penalty for reckless misconduct, which was more in the 
nature of "a reward for securing the punishment of one who has 
committed a wrong of a public nature."198 The court rejected that 
argument, reasoning that the treble damages were "damages be­
cause of ... bodily injury" insofar as the bodily injury was an "es­
sential predicate" to recovery.199 The court also stated that "even 
though other interpretations may also be reasonable '[w]hen the 
words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of 
two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the 
loss must, in preference, be adopted. '''200 
193. Id. at 94 n.l (citation omitted). 
194. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977). 
195. Id. at 204-05, 567 P.2d at 1015. 
196. 203 Conn. 667, 526 A.2d 522 (1987). 
197. Id. at 671, 526 A.2d at 524. 
198. Id. at 670-71, 526 A.2d at 524. 
199. Id. at 671, 526 A.2d at 524. 
200. Id. at 672, 526 A.2d at 524 (quoting Raffell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 141 
Conn. 389, 392, 106 A.2d 716, 718 (1954». 
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2. Public Policy Considera'tions 
Even in those cases where the insurance policy may admit of 
an interpretation of coverage for punitive damages, courts may still 
determine that enforcement would be contrary to public policy. 
Generally, courts review two factors when determining whether 
public policy should bar insurance coverage for punitive damages. 
First, they assess the particular wrongful conduct upon which the 
award of punitive damages is predicated. If the presence of the in­
surance is likely to encourage the wrongful conduct, then courts 
tend not to enforce insurance coverage for punitive damages. Sec­
ond, they assess the purpose for which the punitive damage award 
is made. If the primary purpose is deterrence rather than compen­
sation for the victim, then courts are more likely to conclude that 
public policy requires that coverage for punitive damages be 
barred. 
It would seem that the second prong of the test will almost 
always favor barring coverage for punitive damages. By definition, 
the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate201 but rather 
to punish the wrongdoer and deter future wrongful conduct: 
[P]unitive damages ... are neither equitable nor corrective; puni­
tive damages serve but one purpose - to punish and through 
punishment to deter. "Punitive damages by definition are not in­
tended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the 
tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, 
and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.''202 
The primary purpose served by punitive damages for discrimi­
nation under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is the deterrence of em­
201. Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 535, 18 A.2d 357, 358 
(1941) (punitive damages are "awarded beyond those which [are] compensatory"). 
·202. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70· 
71,743 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Cal. 1987) (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247,266-67 (1981»; see also Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 
440-41 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.), which stated that: 
If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, 
punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not com· 
pensate the plaintiff for his injury since compensatory damages already have 
made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the insurance 
company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the 
extent to which the public is insured, the burden would ultimately come to rest 
not on the insurance companies but on the public, since the added liability to 
the insurance companies would be passed along to the premium payers. Soci­
ety would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured. 
Id. 
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ployment discrimination_ "This record and its subsequent 
interpretation by the courts, leaves no doubt that the primary pur­
pose of [T]itle VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment and 
that its secondary purpose is to compensate victims of discrimina­
tion."203 Therefore, in the circumstances of employment discrimi­
nation cases, the second prong favors barring coverage for punitive 
damages. 
With respect to the first prong, however, whether awarding pu­
nitive damages is more likely to encourage the behavior being pun­
ished, the analysis little more interesting. First, in cases where the 
imposition of punitive damages is based on an intentional wrongful 
act, with intent to harm, coverage is universally held to be contrary 
to the public policy and therefore void. Courts seem to agree that 
the threat of punitive damages serves to deter persons from engag­
ing in intentional wrongful conduct and that permitting coverage 
would have the effect of encouraging such conduct. "Where a per­
son is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a freedom 
of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions 
against such misconduct. "204 
Where courts part company is in those situations where the im­
position of punitive damages is based on conduct which is not inten­
tionally harmful, such as recklessness or gross negligence. For 
example, punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are 
based upon a finding of "reckless indifference to the federally pro­
tected rights of an aggrieved individual."205 Many, indeed most, 
courts hold that when the basis of a punitive damage award is some­
thing less than that of an intentionally inflicted injury, insurance 
coverage for such punitive damages is not contrary to public policy. 
[A]s long as insurance companies are willing, for a price, to con­
tract for insurance to provide protection against liability for puni­
tive damages to persons or corporations deemed by them to be 
"good risks" for such coverage, and as long as liability for puni­
tive damages continues to be extended to "gross negligence," 
"recklessness" and for other conduct contrary to societal inter­
ests, we are in agreement with those authorities which hold that 
insurance contracts providing protection against such liability 
should not be held by courts to be void as against public 
policy.206 
203. Anastassiou, supra note 154, at 197. 
204. Northwestern, 307 F.2d at 440. 
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(I) (1988). 
206. Harrell v. "fravelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 217, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021-22 
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The basis for such decisions is that, while punitive damages 
may serve to deter persons from engaging in intentionally harmful 
behavior, these courts believe that it is purely speculative whether 
the prohibition of coverage for punitive damages would deter reck­
less or grossly negligent conduct. In a case permitting coverage for 
punitive damages based on "recklessness," the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee stated: 
We are not able to agree the closing of the insurance market, on 
the payment of punitive damages, to such drivers would necessar­
ily accomplish the result of deterring them from their wrongful 
conduct. This State, in regard to the proper operator of motor 
vehicles, has a great many detailed criminal sanctions, which ap­
parently have not deterred this slaughter on our highways and 
streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the 
payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty drivers 
would in our opinion contain some element of speculation.207 
The court concluded that the reason for the prohibition on cover­
age for punitive damages ceases to exist when something less than 
intentional wrongful conduct is sufficient to justify such an 
award.208 
Unlike the Tennessee courts, courts in other jurisdictions, such 
as Rhode Island, New York, and California, believe that punitive 
damages actually deter reckless conduct. 209 These courts assert that 
(1977). What really seems to "stick in the craw" of these courts is the fact that the 
insurance companies collect premiums to cover punitive damages and then turn around 
and argue that coverage should not be enforced because it would be violative of public 
policy. 
It is one thing for an insurance company to write a policy with provisions 
which exclude liability for punitive damages and to ask that this court construe 
and apply such policy provisions. It is quite another thing, however, for an 
insurance company which has written and issued an insurance policy in terms 
which include coverage for punitive damages-presumably at a premium 
which the insurance company believed to be sufficient as consideration for 
such coverage-to ask this court to relieve it from such liability under its own 
insurance contract for a judicial declaration that the contract is void for rea­
sons of "public policy." . 
Id. 
207. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964). 
208. The court in Lazenby did not address the second rationale for the imposition 
of punitive damages, punishment. 
209. See California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 210 Cal. Rptr. 
140, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). ("The state's policy with respect to punitive damages 
would be frustrated by permitting punitive damages to be assessed against an insurance 
carrier."); Allen v. Simmons, 533 A.2d 541, 544 (R.I. 1987) (satisfaction of a punitive 
damages award should remain with the wrongdoer and should not be cast upon the 
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punitive damages deter the moral hazard upon which liability is 
predicated. The rationale is based on the premise that if a person 
has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he bears 
less of the cost for his conduct. 
Insurance therefore tends to increase the likelihood that the in­
sured risks will come to pass .... If an insurance policy were to 
cover [an employer's] wilful racial discrimination, the people 
[making employment decisions for the employer] could indulge 
their own preference for discrimination at little risk to them­
selves. The [employer] would pay higher [premiums,] but given 
the insurance, [employers] would be more likely to 
discriminate.21o 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that insurance cover­
age to indemnify the actual wrongdoer211 for punitive damages im­
posed for reckless conduct is contrary to public policy. In Tedesco 
v. Maryland Casualty Co. ,212 an injured plaintiff had recovered a 
punitive damage award from the operator of a motor vehicle by 
reason of the operator's negligence. The operator's insurance com­
pany denied coverage on the grounds that under the language of 
the policy "liability imposed upon him [the insured] by the law for 
damages ... because of bodily injury" did not include punitive dam­
ages.213 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed, observing that it 
would be contrary to public policy to enforce "a policy which ex­
pressly covered an obligation of the insured to pay a sum of money 
in no way representing injuries or losses suffered by the plaintiff but 
imposed as a penalty because of a public wrong."214 Therefore, it 
held that: 
the additional sum representing the doubling of the compensa­
tory damages is, in its essence, a liability imposed, not for dam­
ages because of bodily injury, but as a reward for securing the 
punishment of one who has committed a wrong of a public na­
blameless shoulders of other policyholders); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Vil­
lage of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1979). 
210. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
211. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently held that insurance policies 
covering punitive damages imposed, not on the actual wrongdoer, but rather on some­
one vicariously liable, are enforceable. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co.,203 Conn. 667,672-75,526 A.2d 522, 524-26 (1987). See supra notes 196-199 and' 
accompanying text. 
212. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). 
213. Id. at 538, 18 A.2d at 359. 
214. Id. at 537, 18 A.2d at 359. 
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ture. The words 'liability imposed upon him [the insured] by law 
for damages ... because of bodily injury' do not cover this addi­
tional sum.21S 
3. Vicarious Liability 
A third issue concerns the insurability of punitive damages 
based on vicarious liability, that is, if the corporate employer is as­
sessed punitive damages based on the wrongful discriminatory con­
duct of an employee, should punitive damages assessed against the 
employer be uninsurable as a matter of public policy? Some courts, 
&uch as those in Illinois, have held that an employer may insure 
itself against vicarious liability for punitive damages assessed 
against it as a consequence of the wrongful conduct of the em­
ployee, if the employer had not "in any way, directly or indirectly, 
participated in the wrongful conduct of the employee for which pu­
nitive damages were assessed. "216 
Other courts hold that insurability of punitive damages as­
sessed for purely vicarious liability is against public policy because 
it detracts from the impetus on employers to control the behavior 
of their employees. "[T]he basis for the imposition of vicarious lia­
bility for punitive damages upon a corporation or other employer is 
also one of deterrence, i.e., the deterrent effect upon an employer 
of an award of punitive damages by encouraging him to exercise 
closer control over his employees."217 
There is no Connecticut case law concerning whether it is 
against public policy for an employer to insure itself against vicari­
QUS liability for punitive damages assessed against it as a conse­
quence of an employee's discriminatory conduct. However, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has held that there is no violation of 
public policy for a lessor of automobiles to insure itself for vicarious 
liability based on the drunk driving of its lessee. In Avis Rent A Car 
System, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,218 the Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated that, while it may be against public policy to 
indemnify the actual wrongdoer for punitive damages, there is no 
reason to bar coverage of punitive damages against one whose lia­
bility is purely vicarious. 
215. Id. at 538, 18 A.2d at 359. 
216. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d 1122,1125,420 N.E.2d 1058, 
1061 (1981); see also Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 439-40 
(5th Cir. 1962). 
217. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,214,567 P.2d 1013, 1020 (1977). 
218. 203 Conn. 667, 526 A.2d 522 (1987). 
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Liberty [Mutual] does not, however, point out, nor can we con­
ceive of, any consideration of public policy that would be of­
fended by affording insurance coverage for a liability imposed 
upon Avis under our statutes by virtue of its status as lessor of 
the motor vehicle involved and not because of any actual wrong­
doing on its part.219 
Avis, of course, is distinguishable from a matter involving lia­
bility for discriminatory practices that would justify liability for pu­
nitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The imposition 
of punitive damages on the lessor of motor vehicles would in no 
way deter the wrongful behavior (drunken driving by lessee) sought 
to be punished in the circumstances of Avis. However, as the Ore­
gon Supreme Court has held, employers are in a far better position 
to control the on-site behavior of their employees, and the threat of 
punitive damages may very well stimulate them to take a strong 
affirmative action to prevent discriminatory behavior.220 Therefore, 
the insurability of punitive damages for vicarious liability assessed 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should still be considered to be 
an open question in Connecticut. 
F. Whether Actions Before the EEOC or CCHR0221 Are "Suits" 
Under the terms of a general liability policy, the insurer has the 
right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking damages on account of 
bodily injury or property damage to which the insurance applies. 
The word "suit" typically is defined as a civil proceeding in which 
damages because of bodily injury, property damage, personal in­
jury, or advertising injury to which this insurance applies are al­
leged. "Suit" includes an arbitration proceeding alleging such 
damages to which the insured must submit or submit to with the 
insurer's consent. Sometimes the word "suit" is undefined in the 
policy.222 
Some courts have found that, when not defined, the word 
"suit" can have several meanings, or have a meaning sufficiently 
broad to cover administrative proceedings before the EEOC or 
219. Id. at 674, 526 A.2d at 525-26. 
220. Harrell, 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013. 
221. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the 
Connecticut Commission of Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO") are, 
respectively, the federal and state agencies responsible for enforcement of employment 
discrimination legislation. 
222. See, e.g., School Dist. No.1 v. Mission Ins. Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 703, 650 
P.2d 929, 937 (1982). 
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state agencies charged with responsibility for enforcing anti-dis­
crimination laws.223 These courts rely on dictionary definitions that 
do not limit the meaning to a "court proceeding. "224 In sum, these 
courts interpret "suit" broadly to include any kind of legal proceed­
ing in which legal liability can be imposed on the policyholder. As 
the court held in Campbell Soup: 
An analysis of the quoted language compels the conclusion that 
the duty to defend is triggered when the insured is involved in an 
adversarial proceeding, a consequence of which is the factual de­
termination that legal liability mayor may not be imposed on the 
insured. It matters not whether the factual determination is 
made by a judicial body after the filing of a complaint and a ple­
nary hearing, or whether the determination is made by an admin­
istrative body which has the authority to impose liability upon 
the insured. It is not the forum in which the proceeding is held 
that is critical, but whether, as a result of the hearing, liability 
may be imposed.22s 
Therefore, under the law of New Jersey, when the policyholder is 
before an administrative agency that has initiated a coercive process 
with the authority to impose liability, there exists a "suit," and the 
insurer has a duty to defend such claims if other policy require­
ments are met. 
Application of this standard to proceedings before the EEOC 
and the CCHRO create different results, the reason being that pro­
ceedings before the EEOC do not possess the requisite coercive­
ness or ability to impose liability, while CCHRO proceedings do. 
A review of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act226 and 
the regulations of the EEOC227 reveal that proceedings are volun­
tary, not coercive, and that the EEOC seeks to resolve issues be­
tween employer and employee by means of conciliation and 
persuasion, not through imposition of legal liability. The heart of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides: 
223. Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 239 N.J. Super. 488, 495-97, 571 
A.2d 1013, 1016-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), affd, 239 N.J. Super. 403, 571 A.2d 
969 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 163, 584 A.2d 230 (1990). 
224. See School Dist., 58 Or. App. at 703, 650 P.2d at 937. In School District, the 
court defined "suit" in pertinent part, as "'the attempt to gain an end by legal process; 
prosecution of right before any tribunal,' and more narrowly as 'an action or process in 
a court for recovery of a right or claim: a legal application to a coiJrt for justice. '" See 
also Campbell Soup, 239 N.J. Super. at 496-97,571 A.2d at 1017. 
225. Campbell Soup, 239 N.J. Super. at 496,571 A.2d at 1017-18. 
226. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2-2000h-6 (1988). 
227. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-1601.93 (1995). 
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Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming 
to be aggrieved ... alleging that an employer ... has engaged in 
an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a 
notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances 
of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such employer 
. ~ . within ten days, and shall make an investigation thereof .... If 
the Commission determines after such investigation that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commis­
sion shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful em­
ployment practice by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation and persuasion.228 
The procedural regulations of the EEOC also evidence the 
non-coercive nature of the conciliation process: 
Where the Commission determines that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has oc­
curred or is occurring [and after the review provided for in 
§ 1601.19,] the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate such 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and per­
suasion. In conciliating a case in which a determination of rea­
sonable cause has been made, the Commission shall attempt to 
achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to obtain 
agreement that the respondent will eliminate the unlawful em­
ployment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief.229 
The statute does not empower the EEOC to impose sanctions 
on the employer who refuses to conciliate or to reach an agreement. 
Nor can any statements made by the employer during the concilia­
tion process be used against the employer in a later proceeding.230 
In the event that conciliation efforts fail or the employer re­
fuses to conciliate, the EEOC may initiate a civil action pursuant to 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the EEOC decides not to initiate a 
civil action, it will issue a right-to-sue letter to the aggrieved em­
ployee, who is then free to pursue such an action. 
Therefore, since no adjudication process takes place during an 
EEOC conciliation proceeding, there is no "suit," and the insurer 
has no duty to defend the policyholder. It is only after the EEOC 
or aggrieved employee files suit in the federal district court that an 
adjudicatory process begins. "It is then, for the first time, that the 
obligation of the insurer to defend should properly be raised."231 
228. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
229. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1995). 
230. § 1601.26(a). 
231. Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 239 N.J. Super. 488, 503, 571 
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CCHRO proceedings are an entirely different matter. Unlike 
EEOC proceedings, they possess indicia of coerciveness and the au­
thority to establish legal liability, including ordering payment of 
back pay.232 
Thus, an aggrieved employee, by filing "a complaint in writing 
under oath" with the CCHRO setting forth the particulars of the 
alleged discriminatory practice has in essence filed a "suit" invoking 
the insurer's duty to defend.233 Within ten days after filing the com­
plaint, the CCHRO must cause the complaint to be served upon the 
employer, and the employer "shall" file a written answer under 
oath within thirty days of receipt.234 The employer will be de­
faulted if it fails to answer the complaint.235 Within 90 days of the 
filing of the complaint, the executive director of the CCHRO shall 
review the file, consisting of the complaint, answer, and responses 
to the CCHRO's requests for information, if any, to determine 
whether "the complaint fails to state a claim for relief or is frivolous 
on its face, or there is no reasonable possibility that investigating 
the complaint will result in a finding of reasonable cause. "236 If it 
does not, the complaint is dismissed.237 If the complaint is not dis­
missed, the CHRO "may conduct mandatory mediation sessions, 
expedited or extended fact-finding conferences or complete investi­
gations or any combination thereof ... for the purpose of finding 
facts, promoting voluntary resolution of complaints or determining 
if there is reasonable cause238 for believing that a discriminatory 
practice has or is being committed."239 A mediator may recom­
mend but not order a resolution of the complaint. 
Before issuing a finding of reasonable cause, the investigator 
A.2d 1013, 1021 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), affd, 239 N.J. Super. 403, 571 A.2d 969 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 163,584 A.2d 230 (1990). 
232. The CCHRO does not have authority to impose damages for emotional dis­
tress or attorney's fees. Bridgeport Hosp. v. Commission on Human Rights and Oppor­
tunities, 232 Conn. 91, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). 
233. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-82(a) (1993). A complaint filed pursuant to this 
section must be filed within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. § 46a­
82(e). 
234. § 46a-83(a) (West Supp. 1995). 
235. § 46a-83(g). 
236. § 46a-83(b). 
237. Id. 
238. "[R]easonable cause means a bona fide belief that the material issues of fact 
are such that a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment could believe the 
facts alleged in the complaint." § 46a-83a(a) (1993). See Adriani v. Commission on 
Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 307, 316, 596 A.2d 426, 433 (1991). 
239. § 46a-83(c). 
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must permit each party the opportunity to provide written or verbal 
comments on all evidence in the investigator's file. In the investiga­
tion, the CCHRO may issue subpoenas requiring the production of 
documents and promulgate interrogatories related to the complaint 
under investigation.240 The employer can be defaulted for failure to 
answer such interrogatories or produce the subpoenaed documents. 
Within nine months from the filing of the complaint, the investiga­
tor must make a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause 
in writing and must list the factual findings upon which the decision 
is based.241 If the investigator makes a finding that reasonable 
cause exists, the parties have twenty days from receipt of the notice 
to elect a civil action in lieu of an administrative hearing.242 Finally, 
within 45 days of a finding of reasonable cause, the investigator 
shall certify the complaint to the executive director of the CCHRO 
and to the attorney general.243 
A hearing officer then conducts a de novo hearing on the mer­
its of the complaint; this is not a review of the investigator's find­
ingS.244 If the respondent fails to answer the certified complaint or 
to appear at the hearing it can be defaulted.245 If the presiding of­
ficer finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an employer 
has engaged in a discriminatory practice, the presiding officer must 
state his findings of fact and serve the respondent with an order to 
cease and desist from such discriminatory practice; the presiding of­
ficer may also order the hiring or reinstatement of employees with 
or without back pay.246 Upon review by the superior court, the 
findings of fact made by the presiding officer, if supported by sub­
stantial and competent evidence, are conclusive.247 "In an appeal 
from the decision of the commission, the Superior Court may not 
try the case de novo, adjudicate facts or substitute its own discretion 
for that of the tribunal. The ultimate duty of the trial court [is] to 
decide whether, in light of the evidence, the agency had acted un­
reasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion."248 Re­
240. §§ 46a-83(f), 46a-54(1l). 
241. § 46a-83(b). 
242. § 46a-83(b). 
243. Id. 
244. § 46a-84(b). 
245. § 46a-84(f). 
246. § 46a-86(a), (b). See Bridgeport Hosp. v. Commission of Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91,653 A.2d 782 (1995); Adriani v. Commission on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 307,319,596 A.2d 426, 435 (1991). 
247. § 46a-95. 
248. Billings v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 18 Conn. App. 
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view of the decision is solely a determination as to whether it was 
rendered in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Proce­
dure Act. 
If Connecticut courts were to interpret "suit" as any adjudica­
tory proceeding in which legal liability may be imposed, they would 
have to determine when during the course of the CCHRO proceed­
ings the process becomes sufficiently "coercive" or sufficiently "ad­
judicatory" to be deemed a "suit." The policyholder personally will 
demand that the insurer defend the "suit" when it is served with the 
initial "complaint," which it must "answer" within 30 days or be 
"defaulted." If the insurer refuses, the policyholder will probably 
renew the demand, as each step in the process becomes increasingly 
more "coercive" and the CCHRO "ratchets-up" its ability to im­
pose legal liability. 
While no Connecticut appellate court has defined the word 
"suit" in a general liability policy, in a lengthy decision interpreting 
whether a potential responsibility letter ("PRP") issued by the U.S. 
Environmental Policy Administration constitutes a suit, a Superior 
Court judge held that a "suit" is an action filed in court to secure 
damages or injunctive relief.249 It is unclear what meaning the Con­
necticut Supreme Court would give to the word "suit" where it is 
not defined in the policy. 
G. Whether the Employee Exclusion Applies 
In recent years, general liability policies have typically included 
exclusions for injuries arising out of the employment relationship. 
The particular language may take a number of forms but generally 
they provide that the policy does not apply to "bodily injury or per­
sonal injury sustained by any person as a result of an offense di­
rectly or indirectly related to the employment of such person by the 
named insured." Courts that have had occasion to interpret the ex­
clusion find them to be unambiguous and enforceable.250 The pri­
mary issue in these cases tends to be whether the alleged wrong was 
241, 557 A.2d 147, 149 (1989) (citing Board of Education v. Commission on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 176 Conn. 533, 538-39, 409 A.2d 1013, 1016 (1979)). 
249. Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life and Casualty Corp., No. CV 91­
0396432S, 1995 WL 462270 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995) (emphasis added). 
250. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc. Inc., 2 F.3d 105 
(5th Cir. 1993); Pennsylvania Nat'l v. Kitty Hawk Airways, Inc., 964 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 
1992); Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stotts, 837 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Tex. 1993); North Atl. 
Casualty & Sur. Ins. Co. v. William D., 743 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Teague 
Motor Co. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 73 Wash. App. 479, 869 P.2d 1130 (1994). 
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sufficiently related to the "employment relationship" to come 
within the exclusion. For example, it has been held that publication 
that an employee had been drinking alcohol at a time he was sup­
posed to be available for flight duty,251 sexual harassment on the 
job,252 and invasion of the employee's privacy in a women's bath­
room253 all were directly or indirectly related to the employment 
relationship and thus excluded from coverage. Factual issues also 
arise in wrongful termination actions wherein allegedly defamatory 
remarks are made either when the claimant is still an employee or 
when the claimant is a former employee.254 Arguably, alleged de­
famatory remarks made post-employment, if they relate to the 
claimant's work, may be sufficiently related to the employment re­
lationship to come within the exclusion. 
In addition, the employer liability exclusion may not apply to 
claims made against an insured who is not the employee's "em­
ployer." That is, claims made against supervisors or co-employees 
may not fall within the exclusion.255 For exampJe, in Western Heri­
tage Insurance Co. v. Magic Years Learning Centers and Child Care, 
Inc. ,256 the court observed that the employer liability exclusion 
barred coverage of claims made by "any employee of the insured" 
and not "any employee of any insured."257 When read in conjunc­
tion with the severability clause, the United States Court of Ap­
peals for Fifth Circuit Court concluded that "we must read the 
employer liability exclusion as applying separately to each insured, 
251. Pennsylvania Na!'l, 964 F.2d at 480 (the defamation claim-otherwise a 
"personal injury" and covered by the Insuring Agreement was-excluded). 
252. Teague Motor Co., 73 Wash. App. 479, 869 P.2d 1130 (sexual harassment was 
directly or indirectly related to employment of the claimant and therefore was excluded 
from coverage). 
253. North Atlantic, 743 F. Supp. at 1365 (employer had installed two-way mirror 
in female employees' bathroom). 
254. Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for 
Wrongful Employment Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW· 
YER 689, 708 (1994) ("For example, coverage could depend on whether the employer 
said 'you're a stupid and incompetent jerk and you're fired' (arguably not covered be­
cause the insult occurred during employment), or 'you're fired, you stupid and incom­
petent jerk' (possibly covered because the insult occurred post-employment)"). 
255. E.g, Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 540 So. 2d 
745, 749 (Ala. 1989) (holding that employer liability exclusion does not exclude cover­
age of claim of deceased employee against his supervisors); Great S.W. Fine Ins. Co. v. 
Hercules Bldg. & Wrecking Co., 35 Mass App. 0.298,307,619 N.E.2d 353, 358, rev. 
denied, 416 Mass. 1106,622 N.E.2d 1364 (1993) (holding that employer liability exclu­
sion clause excluded claims against corporate employer, but not those against owner! 
president/manager). 
256. 45 F.3d 85 (5th Cir. 1995). 
257. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 
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excluding coverage of an insured only if that insured is the em­
ployer of the injured party."258 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The resolution of employment insurance coverage issues re­
quires thorough knowledge of the underlying causes of action 
presented for coverage and the insurance law principles applicable 
to the claims. It also requires careful reading of the underlying 
complaint because a claimant may, by the particular language used, 
cause potentially covered causes of action to be excluded.259 
Unfortunately, little Connecticut case law regarding insurance 
coverage for employment related claims exists. Case law from 
other jurisdictions provides some guidance, but much of it is con­
flicting. The primary value of these cases, to Connecticut practi­
tioners, is to define the issues and suggest solutions. The 
resolutions of these issue, under Connecticut law, remains to be 
meted out, issue by issue, case by case. 
258. Id. at 89-90. 
259. This most often occurs where a claimant specifically alleges an intent to 
harm where none is required to make out a prima facie case. 
